

It is not uncommon among philosophers working on Descartes's medical, physiological, and "biological" thought to identify the mind-body union as the (robust) source of normativity and teleology in human physiology, grounding concepts of human health and proper function. In this paper, I will problematize this interpretation, distinguishing epistemological and explanatory facets of Descartes's approach to physiology. Then, attending especially to Descartes's Passions of the Soul and Meditation Six, I develop a superior interpretation of Cartesian somatic health and explore its relation to Cartesian psychosomatic well-being.



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