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Time and Temporality: A Heideggerian Perspective on McTaggart's A-series

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Time and Temporality: A Heideggerian Perspective on McTaggart's A-series

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Philosophy Department, Professor Geoff Gorham

ABSTRACT. J.M.E McTaggart first employed the now-standard distinction between the A- and B-series in an attempt to prove the unreality of time. I argue that McTaggart's analysis of time requires that a subject exist within the A-series, and as such lends itself to a Heideggerian conception of time, viewed both through *Being and Time* and Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's theory, that necessitates a 'personal' temporality in order to make 'world-time' intelligible. I also suggest that Heidegger's temporality, formulated as a non-successive unity grounded in Dasein's existential constitution as being-in-the-world, circumvents McTaggart's preemptive charge of circularity and therefore also avoids the conclusion that time is unreal.

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A Note on Abbreviations

Throughout this essay, I often use abbreviations within the text citations, especially in regards to frequently cited works. For convenience and clarity, I have given a list of these abbreviations:

BP: *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Martin Heidegger. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. 1982.

Ph: *Physics*. Aristotle. Translated by R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye. 1950.

SZ: *Being and Time (A Translation of Sein und Zeit)*. Martin Heidegger. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. 1962.

(Note: I use the abbreviation for the original German title due to the fact that the page numbers cited refer to the original pagination, which are given in the margins of the Macquarrie and Robinson *Being and Time* translation.)

Tp: "Temporality". William Blattner. 2005

UT: "The Unreality of Time". J.M.E McTaggart. 1908.

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It is therefore true to say that when you had not made anything, there was no time, because time itself was of your making. And no time is co-eternal with you, because you never change; whereas, if time never changed, it would not be time.

What, then, is time? There can be no quick and easy answer, for it is no simple matter even to understand what it is, let alone find words to explain it. Yet, in our conversation, no word is more familiarly used or more easily recognized than 'time'. We certainly understand what is meant by the word both when we use it ourselves and when we hear it used by others.

What, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled. All the same I can confidently say that I know that if nothing passed, there would be no past time; if nothing were going to happen, there would be no future time; and if nothing *were*, there would be no present time.

Of these three divisions of time, then how can two, the past and the future, *be*, when the past no longer is and the future is not yet? As for the present, if it were always present and never moved on to become the past, it would not be time but eternity. If, therefore, the present is time only by reason of the fact that it moves on to become the past, how can we say that even the present *is*, when the reason why it *is* is that it is *not to be*? In other words, we cannot rightly say that time *is*, except by reason of the impending state of *not being*. — St. Augustine, *Confessions*, Book XI, § 14. (Trans: R.S Pine-Coffin)

I

Aristotle and the Ordinary Conception of Time

§ 1. Introduction

The aim of this essay is to work out, as thoroughly as possible, a conception of time that grasps the intuitive phenomena generally associated with it. Looking historically at the attempts to clarify the meaning of time, we see that Aristotle's examination given in the *Physics* has determined and grounded its understanding. The two primary philosophers that steer this essay – J.M.E. McTaggart and Martin Heidegger – both, whether implicitly or explicitly, draw a great deal from Aristotle. In many of Heidegger's works dealing with temporality – *Being and Time*, generally thought to be Heidegger's most important work, and *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, a lecture course given in 1927, which, according to its translator, was envisioned as the continuation of the project commenced with *Being and Time* - he credits Aristotle for being the first philosopher to deal with the ordinary conception of time. In addition, J.M.E. McTaggart, whose 1908 article, "The Unreality of Time," shaped subsequent analytic discourse surrounding the philosophy of time, picks up on one of the major problems given in Aristotle's *Physics*, although without specific reference. Both Heidegger and McTaggart offer, in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and "The

Unreality of Time” respectively, a somewhat overlapping historical context in which their work takes place, and according to Heidegger, at least, all of these projects take their grounding in Aristotle.¹ He writes:

No attempt to get behind the riddle of time can permit itself to dispense with coming to grips with Aristotle. For he expressed in clear conceptual form, for the first time and for a long time after, the common understanding of time, so that his view of time corresponds to the natural concept of time. (*BP*: 232).²

In addition to Aristotle’s work on the meaning and nature of time, Heidegger also mentions St. Augustine as an important figure in the development of the problems associated with time. In particular, Heidegger references the key moment in Augustine’s *Confessions*, given as this essay’s epigraph, in which he discusses the extraordinary difficulty in dealing with the concept of time; and yet, it is an idea that, in uncritical and everyday discourse, cannot be more familiar. Augustine also writes on the interesting fact of time that, although generally assumed to belong to the class of existent entities, it is, for the most part, constituted by non-existent parts. These two problems, the first of which makes this entire project difficult in itself, and the second of which will be implicitly sought after in this project, justify, I believe, its status of initiating the essay. The second problem – whether time belongs to that class of things that exist or do not

¹ In regards to the precise historical traces, McTaggart views himself completing the task set forth in the works of Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, whereas Heidegger presents the philosophical figures of Augustine, Aquinas, Suarez, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel as those whom he envisions following the Aristotelian tradition.

² Heidegger also references Aristotle’s importance, in conjunction with Augustine’s, earlier in the lecture: “The two ancient interpretations of time which thereafter became standard – Augustine’s...and the first truly great treatise of time by Aristotle – are also by far the most extensive and truly thematic investigation of the time phenomena itself. Augustine agrees with Aristotle also on a series of essential determinations” (*BP*: 231).

exist – stems from one of two questions that Aristotle poses in the beginning of his examination of time. Thus, it seems appropriate to follow Heidegger’s method in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* in discussing Aristotle’s conception of time before analyzing the theories that arise from it.

§2. Aristotle’s Conception of Time

Although Aristotle touches on the idea of time in both *De Anima* and the *Physics*, Book VIII, the primary inquiry takes place in the *Physics*, Book IV, § 10-14. He begins these sections with two questions: “First, does [time] belong to the class of things that exist or to that of things that do not exist? Then secondly, what is its nature?” (*Ph*: 10.217^b31)³ According to Aristotle, the intuitive answer to the first question would be that time belongs to the class of non-being, or at least, that its being is constituted in a strange way. He reasons this due to the fact, later highlighted by Augustine, that the two larger constituents, the past and the future, are characterized, necessarily, by their non-existence: “One part of it has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is not. Yet time – both infinite time and any time you like to take – is made up of these” (*Ph*: 10.218^a2). Aristotle holds that in order for some ‘thing’ to be characterized as being (or as existing), its constitutive parts – either all or, at least, some of them – must also exist. And the ‘now’, the only constituent that may be said to exist is, for Aristotle, not a *part* of time, as a part must be “a measure of the whole, which must be made of parts” (*Ph*:

³ Quotes from Aristotle’s *Physics* appear from *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Volume I, edited by Jonathan Barnes. Citations are given with reference to Immanuel Bekker’s standard Greek editions of Aristotle.

10.218^{a7}). We may interpret this to say that a true *part* of a whole must be constituted in the same way as the whole, and the ‘now’, as a singular term essentially exclusive to any other term in time, is something indivisible, whereas the other constituents of time – past and future – as well as the whole of time are divisible. The ‘now’, therefore, is not a true *part* of time, although, as will soon come to light, time is still, in some manner, constituted by the ‘now’. This deliberation brings about Aristotle’s claim that, as the ‘now’ is indivisible, whereas time as a whole can be divided, time is not made up of a series of existent ‘nows’. The now-reference, on the other hand, is something special with regards to time in Aristotle’s conception, as its characteristics, while they are not in accord with the past and the future, make the past and future intelligible.

With regard to this special feature, Aristotle writes that one may either suppose the ‘now’ to be changing, “other and other,” or remaining the same (*Ph*: 10.218^{a9}). A certain difficulty comes with both: if the ‘now’ is always other, then either the ‘now’ which is past must have ceased to be altogether or must transform itself in another ‘now’.

To this, Aristotle writes:

But the prior ‘now’ cannot have ceased to be in itself (since it then existed); yet it cannot have ceased to be in another ‘now’. For we may lay it down that one ‘now’ cannot be next to another, anymore than a point to a point. If then it did not cease to be in the next ‘now’ but in another, it would exist simultaneously with the innumerable ‘nows’ between the two – which is impossible. (*Ph*: 10.218^{a17})

If, on the other hand, the ‘now’ is always the same, then time, as divisible, would only have one term – the ‘now’, which is also impossible. Or, in another way of stating the same worry, Aristotle states if the ‘now’ were always the same, all events would be simultaneous, and nothing would be earlier and later, a crucial feature with respect to time.

Aristotle goes on to offer some common accounts of time, two of which he finds unsatisfactory, and arrives at a common assumption that serves as a grounding for time, movement or change, which occupies the remaining four sections. Section 10 ends with the following:

But as time is most usually supposed to be motion and a kind of change, we must consider this view.

Now the change or movement of each thing is only *in* the thing which changes or *where* the thing itself which moves or change may chance to be. But time is present equally everywhere and with all things.

Again, change is always faster or slower, whereas time is not; for fast and slow are defined by time...but time is not defined by time, by being either a certain amount or certain kind of it.

Clearly then it is not movement. (We need not distinguish at present between movement and change.) (*Ph*: 10.218^b10)

Aristotle begins by stating that the ordinary conception of time involves movement or change.⁴ This assumption is one that still occupies the ordinary conception, and, as we will see in McTaggart, this is often taken as the basis for theories regarding time.⁵ The question then arises: although we might suppose that time and change are related, in what way are can we conceive of this relationship? Aristotle writes that change is only *in* the thing that changes, which means, I take it, that as an entity moves, change is localized within the entity, not around it in an indefinite place. The motion is only *of* the

⁴ Aristotle writes that it is not necessary to distinguish between change and movement. Later in the *Physics*, movement is defined as a unique case of change (between substance and substance), and though Aristotle does not explicitly distinguish between the two in this section, it does prove very beneficial (both understanding and interpretation) to do so. As such, this point will be discussed below.

⁵ By way of proof for the assertion that time must be related to change, Aristotle writes, "But neither does time exist without change; for when the state of our minds does not change at all, or we have not noticed its changing, we do not think that time has elapsed, any more that those who are fabled to sleep among the heroes in Sardinia do when they are awakened; for they connect the earlier 'now' with the later and make them one, cutting out the interval because of their failure to notice it. So, just as, if the 'now' were not different but one and the same, there would not have been time, so too when its difference escapes our notice the interval does not seem to be time" (*Ph*: 11.218^b22).

moving thing. On the other hand, time is everywhere, around the moving things, but not specifically with them. This distinction – the motion is *of* moving things, whereas time is *around* them – rests on the difference between the nature of the relationship between the concept – time and motion – and the entity *in* motion and *within* time. We can therefore see that, although time *does* depend on motion, the two are *not identical*. Because, however, one cannot conceive of time without change, and when one does perceive change or distinguish events one also holds time to have elapsed, Aristotle concludes that time is also not independent of movement or change (*Ph*: 11.219^a1). What then is time’s relation to movement or change? Aristotle asserts of the nature of time: “For time is just this – number of motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’. Hence time is not movement, but only movement in so far as it admits of enumeration” (*Ph*: 11.219^b1).

§3. Heidegger’s Interpretation of Aristotelian Time

With respect to Aristotle’s thesis, given above, there are four features that require further interpretation: first, the idea of motion or movement, especially with respect to change in general; second, the fact that it appears inherently problematic to *define* time with respect to seemingly temporal determination; third, the concept of number and enumeration; and fourth, how this assertion fits in with Aristotle’s special treatment of the now-reference. Heidegger offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of time in conjunction with his exegesis in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. In this section, I will trace and, to some degree, re-interpret Heidegger’s explanation of Aristotle’s theory in the hopes of framing my own discussion of the phenomenon of time.

Aristotle claims that in his discussion of time, the difference between change and motion or movement is not a necessary point of clarification to make. However, this distinction helps Aristotle avoid charges of reducing his physics of time to spatial determinations. It also helps clarify a point that Heidegger will pick up on in his interpretation of Aristotle: the differing translations of *husteron* (or as Heidegger phonetically writes, ‘husteron’) [ὑστερον] and *proteron* [πρότερον]. This interpretive difference leads Heidegger to dismiss a critique of circularity that McTaggart will bring against conceptions of time in general.

Aristotle writes in Book V of the *Physics*, “[E]verything which is in motion is in place” (*Ph*: Book V.1.225^a32). Yet, Aristotle also writes of three other types of change, which do not belong to spatial difference:

So, too, perishing is not a motion; for a motion has for its contrary either another motion or rest, whereas perishing is the contrary to becoming. Since, then, every motion is a kind of change...and since of these three [changes mentioned elsewhere] those which take the form of becoming and perishing...are not motions: it necessarily follows that only change from subject to subject is motion. (*Ph*: Book V.1.225^b1).

It is clear, then, that for Aristotle, motion is a specific *kind* of change. Change, however, can also encompass things passing between the realm of being and non-being, whereas motion is strictly defined as a change in place, and spatial coordinates, between entities belonging to the class of things that exist. We are able to assert, therefore, that although Aristotle tends to fall back on spatial metaphors for change, or in other words, on motion, when discussing his concept of time, this does not entail that time determinations are reducible to spatial ones. Instead, Aristotle defines change generally as “*from something to something*” (*Ph*: Book V.1.225^a1). Of this general structure, Heidegger writes:

It already becomes clear...that this remarkable structure of the *ek tinos eis ti*, “away from something towards something,” belongs to motion. The comparison with *alloiosis* [becoming different in the sense that one quality changes to another] shows that this “away from something towards something” need not necessarily be take spatially. We shall call this structure of motion its *dimension*, taking the concept of dimension *in a completely formal sense*, in which spatial character is not essential. (*BP*: 242)

The completely formal sense of *dimension* is intended to give rise, I believe, to the idea of single-direction transformation of some entity. Heidegger will derive more from this definition with respect to the ‘*hysteron*’ and ‘*proteron*’ analysis, but it is only on the basis of the concept of time as number that this interpretation becomes intelligible.

That time is “number of motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’” shows us that time is not connected with the moving object, but with the motion itself (*Ph*: 11.219^b1). Yet, we must also recall that time is *not* motion, but motion only insofar as it has a number (*Ph*: 11.219^b2). Time is a kind of number (*Ph*: 11.219^b2). Aristotle writes that the kind of number that time takes part in is not a number in the sense of it being that with which one counts; but it is instead that which is counted. I take this to mean, for example, that if one were counting rocks, the kind of number that is assigned to each of the rocks (one, two, three...) is *not* the number of time; but instead time is only the number of the total rocks – the numerical or measurable distance, so to speak, between the rock given the first particular number and that given the last. That there are ten rocks, for example, shares the same *kind* of number as time.⁶ The specific numbering of the rocks (one, two, three...) is, I take it, the kind of number that could be associated with the location of the

⁶ “Number, we must note, is used in two ways -- both of what is counted or countable and also that with which is counted. Time, then, is what is counted, not that with which we count: these are different kinds of things” (*Ph*: 11.219^b5)

object in motion.⁷ But, were this the case, we would suppose that somehow the summation of all of the numbers associated with location – the counting of the location numbers – would give us time. This, however, cannot be the case, for a counting of spatial numbers simply gives a piece of space, to which, by the difference postulated between motion and change, time is irreducible. Nonetheless, there is some connection between the number of spatial places and time, for this is precisely the function of a watch: telling time, or giving time a number, a duration based upon the movement of a ‘hand’ with respect to determinate spatial locations. This problem – the connection between spatial locations having determinate (or particular) numbers which differ and the number that *is* time leads directly into an interpretation of Aristotle that employs the use of two different senses of ‘proteron’ and ‘hysteron’ – the number, again, in respect to ‘before’ and ‘after’.

Aristotle does seem to distinguish two differing uses of the words proteron and hysteron. Although in both of these differing uses the words are translated as *before* and *after*, there is a definite sense in which the concepts set off by single quotation marks – ‘before’ and ‘after’ – are used with regard to a specifically temporal notion (Heidegger employs the translations of ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ to refer to these instances), where in the other case, those without quotation marks, the before and after only refer to an antecedent and subsequent position within the change. Heidegger’s justification for translating the ‘before’ and ‘after’ (temporal sense) with the terms earlier and later shows itself in Book V of the *Physics*, where Aristotle writes, “And since every change is *from* something to

⁷ Although the rest of the paragraph uses spatially constituted language, we must keep in mind that motion is only a particular kind of change. Thus, although more difficult to envision, the discussion of motion can be extrapolated to include all forms of change.

something – as the word itself indicated, implying something ‘after’ something else, that is to say something earlier and something later...” (*Ph*: Book V.225^a1).⁸ The ‘after’, indicated with single quotes, is directly linked to the earlier and the later, while, in other instances of before and after, there is a direct reference to spatial, or more generally, change determination: “The distinction of before and after hold primarily, then, in place; and there in virtue of relative position” (*Ph*: 11.219^a15). And yet, there is a strong connection between these two senses – the temporal and non-temporal – for Aristotle writes that due to the before and after in virtue of position, there must also be before and after in magnitude, or extension, and consequently, there must also be a before and after with respect to motion. And finally, as motion and time always correspond, Aristotle writes, “But also in time the distinction of before and after must hold” (*Ph*: 11.219^a18). With regards to this parsing of terminology, and although it is a lengthy passage, I believe that it will prove very beneficial to reproduce Heidegger’s introductory comments on Aristotle’s apparent distinction:

The definition of time given by Aristotle is so ingenious that it also fixes this horizon, within which we are supposed to find, along with what is counted in connection with the motion, none other than time. Aristotle says: *arithmos kineseos kata to proteron kai husteron*. We translate this as: time is something counted in connection with encountered motion with a view to the before and after, in the horizon of earlier and later. Time is not only what is counted about the motion, but it is counted there *so far as* that motion stands in the prospect of the before and after when we *follow it as*

⁸ For the sake of simplicity, I would like to reproduce a general schema here. Aristotle seems to use the terms *proteron* and *husteron* in two different ways. *Proteron* is translated as *before* in both cases: in the non-temporal (spatially based) signification, this is not given any offsetting quotations (before), whereas in the temporal sense, the before is given single quotes (‘before’). Similarly, *husteron* is translated as later in the non-temporal sense, while it is translated as ‘later’ with respect to time determinations. Heidegger takes these temporal senses – ‘before’ and ‘after’ – and translates them as *earlier* (*proteron*) and *later* (*husteron*, or as he spells it, *husteron*), leaving before and after with their location based meaning.

motion. The horizon sought for this is that of the earlier and later. Proteron and husteron are translated as earlier and later, but also as before and after. The first determination, the proteron and husteron taken as earlier and later, seems to be impossible. “Earlier” and “later” are time-determinations. Aristotle says, time is what is counted about the motion we encounter in the horizon of time (earlier and later). But this simply means that time is something met within the horizon of time. If I say that time is that pertaining to motion which shows itself when I follow it as motion in the horizon of its earlier and later, the definition of time seems to be a trivial tautology: time is the earlier and later, thus *time is time*. (BP: 241)

Heidegger goes on to write that this seemingly logical error only exists insofar as the two definitions of time are taken to be exactly the same. Instead, Heidegger believes that Aristotle wants to show the inherent structure of time by explaining it in relation to more “*original time*”, which means that as time’s foundation belongs to its essence, so must the foundation of time as number with respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’ be explained as the definition of time through its essential determinations (earlier and later) (BP: 241). As we will see in the next chapter of this essay, this particular problem eventually surfaces within J.M.E. McTaggart’s philosophy, and it leads him to conclude that, due to the necessity of defining time with temporal determinations, time cannot be real, as it involves a vicious circle. The fundamental difference, as we will see, between the interpretations given by McTaggart and Heidegger rests on the fact that Heidegger believes in a more ‘original’ time than that given with respect to ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ determinations. Thus, whereas McTaggart views this problem as the inherent flaw within any conception of time, Heidegger uses it to show that there is an essential difference between the everyday conception of time and temporality.

Heidegger’s method of exposing this original time is to employ the concept of *dimension*, as that along which an object changes *from* something to *something*. This

dimension of a change, in the formal sense (and therefore not necessarily spatial) expresses, for Heidegger, the general notion of a *stretch*, which, I take it, means the notion of *dimension* (as that along which something changes) abstracted from any particular changing. (*BP*: 242). Although Heidegger never gives a complete definition, he does say that spatial extension is a particular modification of the general *stretch*, by which I take him to be saying that just as a line in spatial terms can be taken as the *dimension* in other, non-spatial, changes, so too can extension, as that structure that contains all spatial lines, be taken as a particularly and not necessarily spatial example of *stretch*. The *stretch*, therefore, is the general structure upon which all changes, which further require *dimensions* as that along which an object transforms *from* something *to* something, are built. *Stretch*, then, is that upon which all change is founded, or in other words, is that which necessarily exists if change exists. According to Heidegger, *stretch*, like its particularly spatial character, extension, requires continuity. He writes:

There is no break implied in the concept and essential nature of “from something to something;” it is, instead, a stretching out that is closed within itself. When we experience motion in a moving thing, we necessarily experience along with it *suneches*, [translated as] continuity, and in this continuity itself *ek tinos ei ti* [away from something towards something], dimension in the original sense, stretching out (extension). (*BP*: 242/3)

That stretch requires continuity seems like an intuitive fact, especially due to its comparison with extension, which is always assumed continuous. Furthermore, that an object can change along a dimension seems to require that at no point along the dimension can the change stop and start at two differing points along that dimension. This series of theses – that stretch (or, in the spatially determined example, extension) is necessary for any particular dimension (or, spatially, line) to exist, and that this stretch is

necessarily continuous for change (or motion) to be possible – is echoed in both Heidegger and Aristotle. Aristotle writes:

[W]hat is moved is moved from something to something, and all magnitude [extension] is continuous. Therefore, the movement goes with the magnitude. Because the magnitude [extension] is continuous, the movement too is continuous, and if the movement, then the time; for the time that has passed is always thought to be as great as the movement (*Ph*: 11.219^a10).

Similarly, Heidegger writes that extension and continuity are implicit in motion, and that they are “earlier than motion in the sense of being a priori conditions of motion itself. Where there is motion, there *megethos* [magnitude, or extension] and *suneches* [continuity] are already thought along with it a priori” (*BP*: 243).⁹

Along with experiences of motion, we encounter time, although this is not something made explicit or definite within the *entity* in motion. Motion is always associated with a definite entity, an individuated object moving through definite locations. On the other hand, we say that entities exist within time, and therefore time is not definite in the objects in motion. In an attempt to answer the questions that have arisen thus far in our work on Aristotle’s conception of time, we will conclude this chapter by analyzing time’s relationship to motion and to the ‘now’, the differential between the determinations of before and after as opposed to earlier and later, and the type of number, or counted, that time essentially is.

⁹ Furthermore, he writes, “Motion follows continuity, and continuity follows extendedness” (*BP*: 243).

§4. A Final Interpretation of Aristotelian Time

On a first approximation, the motion of an entity that traverses a continuous path occurs within a series of definite places. Motion, however, cannot be the summation of the fixed, determined places in which the entity exists while along its path. For in this series there is no actual motion, but a set of static points related spatially. In other words, motion is not equivalent to object points of location present alongside each other. Motion can only come through the changing between two bounds, which is a continuous movement along the path. Heidegger writes of this directional, continuous motion:

We must not take the places as a pure juxtaposition of there and here. Instead we must take this there as “away from there” and this here as “towards here,” hence not simply a there and then again another there, but “away from there” and “towards here.” We must see the present contexture of places, the point manifold, in the horizon of an “away from there–towards here” (*BP*: 245).

For Heidegger, this ‘towards-away’ relationship is the primary meaning of the proteron and hysteron distinction. The from-point is the Aristotelian before and the there-point is the Aristotelian after: these relationships are not, strictly speaking, related to each other in any temporal sense, for their relationship is one of points connected to each other only with regard to difference in *direction* in moving along the manifold of places. In this relationship, there is no temporal first, but only a direction toward or from another. I believe that we can envision this manifold of points as one structured like a vector, which is continuous and has a specifically given direction. In a 1924 lecture published under the name *The Concept of Time*, Heidegger writes,

Before and afterwards are not necessarily earlier and later, are not ways of temporality. In the arithmetic sequence, for example the 3 is before the 4, the 8 after the 7. Yet the 3 is not earlier than the 4 on this account. Numbers are not earlier and later, because they are not in time at all.

Earlier and later are quite determinate before and after. (*The Concept of Time*: 18)

Time as such is *not* explicitly derived from this relationship between the location points (or any points, for that matter; although Heidegger, following Aristotle, is using spatial relationships for the sake of example, we must keep in mind that spatial motion is just one particular kind of change). Time is, however, *grounded* in this relationship, for the interpretation of this “away from there–towards here” places ‘now’ determinations in conjunction with the moving object through its localized points, and from these ‘nows’, the second sense of *proteron* and *hysteron*, the earlier and later, arises as that upon which time is explicitly built.

Heidegger posits a particular kind of “retaining” and “expecting” that one must take alongside the moving object in order to derive *transition*. In traversing the spatial locations of the object in its directional manifold, “we *retain* the first traversed place as the *away-from-here* and *expect* the next place as the *towards-here*” (*BP*: 245) This retaining and expecting is necessary, as the *towards-* and *from-* only make sense through a distinction of two points, both of which cannot be ‘now.’ In other words, the notion of *transition* relies on differentiating the ‘now’ points and conceiving them in a successive and directional series. Once the structure of “away from there–towards here” is recognized, however, the particular places themselves lose meaning. For, as the dimension of change is continuous, the particular *stretch* of change can exist at any given length and there is no longer a need for an *arbitrary* here-there differentiation.

The terms “retention” and “expectation” only have meaning with respect to the phenomenon of time that pre-supposes a being-in-the-world witnessing time.¹⁰ It is in the vein of this phenomenon that time, for Aristotle, can be constituted with respect to the earlier and later. Every here and there is implicitly assigned a now, as, when we follow the motion of a clock, we say, “now-*here*, now-*there*.” Therefore, what is counted with respect to time are the ‘nows’: “We count a sequence of nows or of thens and at-the-times. The then is the not-yet-now or the now-not-yet; the at-the-time is the now-no-longer or the no-longer-now. The then and the at-the-time both have a now-character, a now reference” (*BP*: 246) Thus, the ‘now’, which in one sense is the number given to motion, is counted and given the number of time, as that which is the number counted.

Time, for Aristotle, is made up of ‘nows’ that are assigned to each here and there of location, or of any two states along the dimension of change. This constitution out of ‘nows’ is not used in the sense, as Aristotle mentions at the beginning of section 10 of Book IV, in which the ‘now’ is non-existent and not a *part* of the whole, for this passage conceived of the now as an infinitely small or singular barrier between the past and the future – the now-not-yet and the no-longer-now. Instead, the ‘now’ upon which we have arrived is that which makes the entirety of time-series intelligible. The ‘now’, as that which follows the moving thing, is the reference that allows the earlier and later to be given as determinations of time, and as such, makes the now-not-yet and no-longer-now have meaning. The ‘now’ articulates the earlier and later, as it, in itself, contains reference to the now-not-yet and no-longer-now. For as the ‘now’, according to Aristotle,

¹⁰ I refrain from using the term subject in this context due to Heidegger’s ultimate project of disregarding the distinction between subject and object. Instead, being-in-the-world conveys, for Heidegger, the inseparable nature of Dasein and the world of significance.

is always changing in particular definition but not in essence, it also contains a *dimensional* change through which it too has the character of transition. This *transitional* 'now' *stretches* itself into the non-being of the past and future, and contains with it their grounding and intelligibility. Heidegger writes:

Time is not a manifold of nows thrust together, because at each now every other now already no longer is and because, as we saw earlier, a curious stretching out on both sides into non-being belongs to time. The now is not correlated as a point to a fixed point and it cannot belong to it in that way, because by its essential nature it is both beginning and end. In the now as such there is already present a reference to the no-longer and the not-yet. It has dimension within itself; it stretches out toward the not-yet and the no-longer. The not-yet and no-longer are not patched on to the now as foreign but belong to its very content. (*BP*: 248)

II

J.M.E. McTaggart and the Unreality of Time

§1. Introduction

In 1908, J.M.E. McTaggart published his most recognized text, “The Unreality of Time”¹¹. A British idealist and Hegel scholar, McTaggart set out to prove what he felt many canonical philosophers (Spinoza, Kant, Schopenhauer, Bradley and Hegel) had also proposed – the unreality of time. Although McTaggart’s argument that time is unreal has been cast by some philosophers as a sophism¹², I believe that, though the conclusion may be challenged, the argument presented is worth analyzing. In the very least, the conceptual framework developed in McTaggart’s argument has had a lasting effect on the discourse surrounding examinations of time. As mentioned in the previous section of this essay, McTaggart draws on a problem associated with the Aristotelian conception of time, namely, that in order to give a proper notion of time, one must use temporal determinations, such as earlier and later. In virtue of this, McTaggart asserts that all

¹¹ J.M.E. McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time,” *Mind* 17 (1908): 457. McTaggart also presented an alternate version of this essay in Chapter 33 of his work *The Nature of Existence*, II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927). I am not aware of any significant differences between the two versions that would impact the analysis presented here. Therefore, I will be using the original article, and all references will appear accordingly.

¹² An example of this argument is found in Kenneth Rankin’s “McTaggart’s Paradox: Two Parodies,” *Philosophy* 56 (1981): 333.

conceptions of time are inherently circular and he therefore concludes that time is unreal. In the previous section we discussed Heidegger's attempt to get out of this problem by claiming that there is a different sense of time – "original" time, or temporality – which is more fundamental than the everyday conception, and, based upon time's grounding in original temporality, the charge of circularity may be avoided. While we will analyze Heidegger's "original" temporality much more closely in the following section, I wish to take this opportunity to lay out McTaggart's argument against the reality of time and, in doing so, hope to show that although at the outset McTaggart's and Heidegger's conceptions of time seem radically different, they are, in fact, similar in important ways.

One of these points of similarity, I maintain, is the basic necessity of a subject¹³ existing within the world, used in both conceptions to ground time. Although this necessity is not made explicit in McTaggart, I now hope to show that McTaggart's analysis of time requires that a subject exist within his A-series, and as such lends itself to a conception of time that necessitates a 'personal' temporality in order to make the ordinary conception of time intelligible. This section will begin with an analysis of McTaggart's philosophy of time, with respect to both the framework that he develops, as well as his attempted proof of the unreality of time. I will then discuss the necessary requirement of token-reflexive statements in his philosophy, which will lead to the further discussion of the requirement for individuals to be present *within* the temporal structure. This will lead us to the development of a 'personal' temporality that operates in

¹³ Heidegger will not want to use the words 'subject' or 'subjective' to refer to Dasein's existence. In this section, however, for the sake of ease and clarity, I will use this term, as McTaggart does not theorize about the existence of individuals, subjects, et cetera in his text. I believe, therefore, that we can employ the word 'subject' in referring to McTaggart's philosophy as long as we keep in mind its inappropriateness when referring to Heidegger.

conjunction with McTaggart's time series, which I will explain through the notion of changing events. Finally, I will discuss the underlying assumption within McTaggart's philosophy of time, which forces him to conclude that time is unreal.

§2. McTaggart's Argument

McTaggart's argument can be separated into two parts. Within the first, McTaggart develops distinctions between two temporal series, concluding that one is as essential, and more fundamental to the overall time series than the other. In the second half of his argument, he proceeds to defend the overall conclusion that time is unreal. While the conclusion of this argument is certainly counter to intuition, and therefore intriguing, many of the turning points for the argument appear within the first part. As such, I will be primarily focused on this framework given in the first part of McTaggart's argument. In order to discuss our further analysis of time through the lens of McTaggart's philosophy, it will prove useful to provide foundation with an overview of the argument itself.

In beginning to discuss the differing ways that time may be conceived, McTaggart crucially distinguishes between the A-series and the B-series, both of which are equally *essential* to time. The A-series, as McTaggart defines it, consists in relations, or qualities, of positions in time as past, present, and future, such that the series of positions runs from the far past, to the past, to the present, to the future, and to the far future (*UT*: 458). Thus, the distinctions of positions in the A-series are *not* permanent, considering that a position in time given the true predicate of *present* must necessarily be given the predicate of *past*

at a later time in order to produce a true statement. We can also see that these three predications – past, present, and future – are incompatible when placed upon the same term simultaneously, which is a central aspect in the second part of McTaggart’s argument. The B-series, on the other hand, is the series of positions in time that hold the permanent relation of ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ (*UT*: 458). McTaggart also distinguishes between moments of time, which are individuated positions in the time series, and the events that happen within them. He states that an event is all that happens within a moment of time, but leaves open the opportunity for someone to claim that within a moment of time a plurality of events may take place (*UT*: 458). A moment in time, then, can be interpreted as a position in the time series that differs from all others only numerically. It can therefore be seen as an empty place in which there exist events. An event, in this case, seems to be all that happens or exists within these empty moments.

McTaggart claims that when we experience time, we are able to form a conception of both the A-series and the B-series, as one can both construct a temporal manifold consisting of relations of earlier and later, as well as relations of past, present, and future (*UT*: 458). Thus, McTaggart claims, both temporal series are *essential* to time. Furthermore, McTaggart claims that the A-series is also ultimately *fundamental* to time, whereas the B-series is not. McTaggart justifies this claim – that the A-series and B-series are both equally essential to time, yet the A-series is more fundamental – by distinguishing two characteristics¹⁴ of the time series: one, that change is necessary for time, and two, that time necessarily has an order. This first characteristic, as we will recall, was also present in the Aristotelian conception of time. That time involves change

¹⁴ McTaggart uses the term ‘characteristic’ to encompass both the idea that positions in time are distinguished relationally or by the qualities they possess.

is the basic assumption for Aristotle, and the question then becomes, what is the relationship between the two? That there *is* a relationship, however, is only touched on insofar as Aristotle claims that they cannot be thought of apart from one another (*Ph*: 11.218^b22).

McTaggart begins his discussion of the two necessary characteristics of time with the notion of change. He writes:

It would, I suppose, be universally admitted that time involves change. A particular thing, indeed, may exist unchanged through any amount of time. But when we ask what we mean by saying that there were different moments of time, or a certain duration of time, through which the thing was the same, we find that we mean that it remained the same while other things were changing. A universe in which nothing whatever changed (including the thoughts of the conscious beings in it) would be a timeless universe. If then, a B series without the A series can constitute time, change must be possible without an A series. (*UT*: 459)

For McTaggart, genuine change must occur for the time structure to be fully constituted. This change, however, must be such that the event itself doesn't change. McTaggart holds that once a term is in a series, it can never cease to be in the series, nor can the term itself change. The B-series – again, constituted through the relations of earlier and later – is a set of permanent characteristics, and therefore cannot give us genuine change. To use an example similar to McTaggart's, if the event M comes before the event N, it must always do so, for this relation has been given throughout the entire time series, and can never cease¹⁵. In other words, the relationship of two events in time – my tenth birthday

¹⁵ “An event can never cease to be an event. It can never get out of any time series in which it once is. If N is ever earlier than O and later than M, it will always be and has always been, earlier than O and later than M, since the relations of earlier and later are permanent. And as, by our present hypothesis, time is constituted by a B series alone, N will always have a position in a time series, and has always had one. That is, it will always be, and has always been, an event, and cannot begin or cease to be an event” (*UT*: 459).

and my eleventh birthday, are permanently related through the determinations that my tenth birthday is earlier than my eleventh and that my eleventh birthday is later than my tenth. These relationships, which constitute the B-series, have always been the case and will always be the case. That is, for McTaggart, it was true one hundred years before I was born that my tenth birthday was earlier than my eleventh. Likewise, it will be true in one hundred years that the same relationships hold. The only way, therefore, to allow for change on the B-series, is to somehow posit that the events themselves change, which would change the series, and hence is not allowed to constitute genuine change through time. He writes:

Since, therefore, what occurs in time never begins or ceases to be, or to be itself, and since, again, if there is to be change of what occurs in time (for the timeless never changes), I submit that only one alternative remains. Changes must happen to the events of such a nature that the occurrence of these changes does not hinder the events from being events, and the same events, both before and after the changes. (*UT*: 460)

When analyzing the time series, McTaggart holds that in only one respect can something change such that the events themselves do not change, and this is the set of non-permanent characteristics of past, present, and future. In other words, as neither the events, nor B-series relationships between events changeable, the only determination remaining, the A-series relationships must change with respect to time. Given any event's passage through time, it seems apparent to McTaggart that though the event itself cannot change, some characteristic of it must, for otherwise, there would not be change at all, and therefore no time. Now, for McTaggart, the only characteristics of an event that can change without changing the event are the determinations of past, present, and future. He writes:

And in every respect but one [an event] is equally devoid of change. It began by being a future event. It became every moment an event in the nearer future. At last it was present. Then it became past, and will always remain so, though every moment it becomes further and further past. (*UT*: 460)

Take, for example, the event of my tenth birthday. Facts about that event, such as, say, that it was raining, cannot change, for it will always *be* true and it always *was* true that my tenth birthday event involves a rainy day. Furthermore, as we saw above, the B-series relationship between my tenth birthday and my eleventh are unchanging. Thus, McTaggart holds that the A-series must be *fundamental* to time, as the B-series is not sufficient for grounding the time series; the only way to constitute time fully is through change, and the only way to posit genuine change is through the A-series. McTaggart uses these two terms – *fundamental* and *essential* – in such a way that we can interpret *essential* series, the A– and the B–, to mean the series which must be employed in order to fully constitute all of the relationships of events. On the other hand, *fundamental*, for McTaggart, means something much more basic – a *fundamental* series is necessary to time to exist.

The removal of the A-series from time still leaves a series, however, as the B-series is also *essential* to time. This series is the C-series, which is simply a series of ordered terms. This, however, while giving an ordering, does not provide a necessary direction through which the series must travel. An example of a series of this type is the set of natural numbers, which provides a necessary order of terms, yet which also may be traversed in either an increasing or a decreasing direction. Time, on the other hand, intuitively *does* give a necessary direction through which one must traverse, and we can see this direction arising from the A-series determination of past, present, and future. For

McTaggart, because the determination of the B-series – earlier and later – are in themselves temporal, and therefore, because the B-series could not exist without the A-series, which is necessary for change, and therefore necessary for time, we can see again that the A-series is more *fundamental* than the B-series. Furthermore, because the B-series exists as an ordering of events, the C-series is also *fundamental* to time, as it also partially constitutes the B-series. Or, in other words, if the C-series, which is simply permanent order, did not exist, there would be no B-series, which is the relation of permanent order *and* direction.

After grounding the framework for the time-series, McTaggart moves on to his proof that time cannot be real or exist. Based on the grounding of the time series in the *essential and fundamental* A-series, which consists in events having the characteristics of past, present, and future, McTaggart attempts to show that as the determinations of the A-series are contradictory and unreal, so therefore, is time. For, as we have seen, the A-series involves determinations of past, present, and future, and being the only way to produce genuine change to build the time series, these determinations are essential to time. However, these determinations are necessarily incompatible with each other. In “The Unreality of Time”, the incompatible nature of the A-series determinations stem from pure assertion on McTaggart’s part. He writes, “Past, present, and future are incompatible determinations. Every event must be one or the other, but no event can be more than one. This is essential to the meaning of the terms” (*UT*: 486). Although a simple assertion, it seems apparent to me, that *at least* we can accept this incompatibility based upon the definition as capturing the ordinary conception of time. The problem arises when we try to distinguish these determinations without presupposing another time

series. In other words, A-series determinations are incompatible, yet all three of them are (at some time) predicated on every event, which entails a contradiction. Because, for McTaggart, events are *in* time (*UT*: 458), and because A-series determinations cover the whole of the time series, or in other words, because there is no other determination in the A-series *other* than past, present, and future, all events must be determined at some time as present, at some time as past, and as some time as future.

The response to this claim is, of course, that not all three are predicated at once, and there only seems to be a contradiction in terms when all are applied simultaneously. However, to say that they may all be true, and just involve a contradiction when applied simultaneously, is to presuppose another time-series. This means, in effect, that without being able to distinguish the ‘at some time’ with respect to A-series determination, they involve a contradiction based upon their definitions. However, to be able to distinguish the ‘at some time’ is to use a notion of time while trying to prove time exists. Thus, to save the A-series, one must presuppose it, which involves a vicious circle. In other words, one must assume a time-series within a time-series in attempting to prove time’s existence. I will argue here that this is due to McTaggart’s idealist view of ‘existence’, and while we may not accept it, the framework leading up to the conclusion gives support to a phenomenological, and in particular, to a Heideggerian, view of temporality. We can define Heidegger’s phenomenological view of time very broadly: (i) that time, as ordinarily conceived, is founded upon a more fundamental, or primordial structure, namely, temporality. (ii) That this temporality arises alongside and is mutually constitutive with Dasein’s being-in-the-world. In other words, we can broadly define temporality as a structure that is dependent on a subject in its founding time. For the sake

of this section, we can equate Dasein with the term 'subject', for the only point that rests upon the following argument is the requirement of a subject (or Dasein) in order to constitute the temporal grounding of the time series or, in other words, that there is not temporal structure independent of subjects (or Daseins) and that without a structure of temporality, time as such has not meaning or intelligibility.

§3. Token-Reflexive Statements

In beginning to discuss the necessary requirement of a subject to exist within a true temporal structure, we must first discuss the requirement of token-reflexive statements within the A-series. A token-reflexive statement is a statement in which the speaker's position in relation to the statement enters essentially when conferring truth-values upon that statement. In other words, a token-reflexive statement has its truth-value grounded in the circumstances of the utterance. Examples of these types of statements that are important to our discussion are 'now' and 'I'. Specifically, if one were to say: 'Now it is raining', the truth-value of this statement has its basis in the circumstances of the speaker. Because the temporal manifold within McTaggart's philosophy finds its basis in the A-series, which has determinations of past, present, and future, it is apparent that token-reflexive statements are necessary to ground the manifold within the time-series itself. In this, I follow Michael Dummett, who writes: "McTaggart is saying that on the other hand a description of events as taking place *in time*, is impossible unless

temporally token-reflexive expressions enter into it” (116).¹⁶ We can convince ourselves of the necessity of token-reflexive statements entering into the A-series by considering what the types of facts consisting of the characteristics of past, present, and future must be. In order for any temporal fact to be given a truth-value within the A-series, the context of the speaker must be taken into account. For example, were I to utter today the statement, “Now I am twenty-two,” and were I also to utter this same statement in the future, say, in another year, the truth-value of the statement would be false. Again, the truth-value rests upon the reflexive context in which my relationship to the statement is given. In contrast, were anyone to utter the statement, “Zach is twenty-two on April 13, 2010,” it would be true regardless of any A-series determination.¹⁷ This is due to its lack of any temporal A-series determinations. As such, however, it takes the notion of change out of the time series, as it fails to refer to any feature subject to change through time. In doing so, the determination that is given to the statement is one regarding the B-series. It will always be and always was true that I am twenty-two on that day. Clearly then, all statements placing the characteristics of the A-series onto events – which McTaggart believes grounds the temporal manifold – contain, and require, token-reflexive statements.

¹⁶ Michael Dummett, “A Defense of McTaggart’s Proof of the Unreality of Time,” in *Time*, ed. Jonathan Westphal and Carl Levenson (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1993)

¹⁷ The difficulty in constructing this statement, and the rarity with which it would be used is, I believe, support for the fact that A-series determinations ground the time-series more fundamentally than B-series determinations. It seems odd that one would use a present tense verb for a statement with a truth function independent of any particular temporal determination, and we can take this as upholding the idea that token-reflexive statements, in which the speaker’s circumstance enter essentially, are necessary in constructing an intelligible time-series.

Now, from the idea that token-reflexive statements are essential to the A-series, and therefore, for McTaggart, to time, it follows that he is also ultimately grounding the temporal series in a subject within that time-series. As such, he can be said, at least in part, to be giving an account of temporality. We can defend this conclusion by analyzing the A-series-based temporal structure against the time-series that would be constructed from determinations given within the time-series *without* the feature of token-reflexive statements, as well as against a time-series constructed from wholly outside that time-series. If an individual were to experience time as that given from ordered terms within the series, then one would experience a set of phenomena corresponding to each term in the series. And although an individual could explain every detail about the terms themselves; if, for example, the individual had some God-like view, the characteristic that would still be left wanting within this series based time is the determination of 'now'. And, as we have seen in Aristotle, the 'now' is the reference upon which all three A-series determinations are founded. It is difficult to construct an example of this type, but we can imagine our time series being given as the set of natural numbers. At no point, though we may be able to fully determine each number in all other ways, will we be able to characterize which term in the series we are experiencing 'now'. This determination of 'now' is, for McTaggart, what grounds the entire temporal series, as that is how the individual who exists within the time series is able to construct the manifold of past, present, and future determinations. As such, any characterization of the time-series not able to provide an experienced 'now' cannot ground the A-series, and therefore, cannot ground time. This complication is avoided when we are able to place the individual in

some context of reading off the numbers, but this is to allow for token-reflexive statements to enter back into the determinations of the terms in the temporal series.

Similarly, we can imagine constructing time from determinations given wholly outside the time series, where all events are presented, and exist, at once, ordered along some axis. This view of the construction of the time series, however, leaves series under-determined, for what is crucial with respect to time, according to McTaggart and, as we have seen, Aristotle, is *change*. Thus, even if one were to be able to fully determine each 'now' moment in the series from outside, similar to points in a line, the time structure cannot account for the continuity of movement between the points. We saw precisely this worry of the summation of 'now' points in connection with Aristotle's conception of time. This is not acceptable on McTaggart's view (neither was it on Aristotle's), as what is essential is the continuity of time structure, of the sequence of events. For only in this manner is one able to fully account for the truly *changing* nature of those of events. If one were to construct the time manifold from outside of it, as the four-dimensionalist does, it is constructed as static. A four-dimensionalist holds that one can fully determine time as a fourth dimension, appended onto the current view of a three-dimensional space, where objects exist in temporal parts, as opposed to being fully present at each particular time. This however, does not allow for any view of passage, or becoming, which seems necessary on McTaggart's view. McTaggart's view requires an account of the changing relations between the events and their determinations, or, in other words, an account of the movement of an individual through time. The common example given by the four-dimensionalist to aid in explicating his view is an image of a road running parallel to the temporal axis, with 'temporal slices' of an object being taken in segments perpendicular

to road. Theodore Sider explains: “A person’s journey through time is like a road’s journey through space. The dimension along which a road travels is like time; a perpendicular axis across the road is like space. Parts cut the long way – lanes – are like spatial parts, whereas parts cut crosswise are like temporal parts” (2).¹⁸ This view of time, which is that view constructed from outside of the time-series itself, completely ignores the *movement* of the individual through time, or the continuous changing of the ‘now’ point. Although the four-dimensionalist can account for the individual at two different points of time, there exists no means to account for the passing through time, and therefore no way to account for the always-changing relationship of past, present, and future. I conclude, therefore, that this feature of the individual or object ‘becoming’ through time is an essential part of McTaggart’s philosophy. This argument, also given by Dummett, goes against Theodore Sider’s claim that McTaggart was a four-dimensionalist (3, footnote). In fact, as McTaggart’s view *requires* token-reflexive statements to be given by an individual in the time-series, we see that his view is completely contrary to the four-dimensional picture.

§4. Changing Events

Now that we have seen that token-reflexive statements enter essentially into McTaggart’s view of time, which leads to the further condition that an individual exist within the temporal series in order to sufficiently condition the A-series, we can analyze McTaggart’s view of the changing characteristics of events. We can recall that

¹⁸ Theodore Sider, *Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

McTaggart holds that it is events that constitute the terms of the temporal series, not the moments that contain them. At first glance, this seems an inconsequential distinction, or at the very least, a strange one. In his article “Changes in Events and Changes in Things,”¹⁹ Arthur Prior comments on the strangeness of discussing changes in events:

By and large, to judge the way that we ordinarily talk, it's *things* that change, and events don't change but *happen*... One of the things that make us inclined to deny that events undergo changes is that events *are* changes – to say that such and such an event has occurred is generally to say that some thing has, or some things have, changed in some way. (36)

As Prior points out, it is initially very strange to think about events, which are generally considered changes, changing through time. Generally, one would talk about *things* changing, like the motion of an object. An *event* like a lecture, however, tends to be conceived of as something that happens. In Prior's essay, he successfully points to one way in which we generally do think about changes changing – the physical characteristic of acceleration, where a given velocity, or change, is said to be changing. With this background in mind, Prior hopes to dispel the initial strangeness of the idea of changes changing by discussing the ways in which events slow down or speed up. Again, a lecture is something that we would normally speak of as changing in relation to our perception of it. For example, it is very common to say that boring lectures move slowly. Prior recognizes, however, that this notion of events changing is to a large degree insufficient, as the only change that is said to take place is that which takes place while the event itself is occurring. He writes, “For the other changes in events which I have mentioned are ones which go on in the event *while it is occurring*; for example, if a lecture gets duller or a

¹⁹ Arthur Prior, “Changes in Events and Changes in Things,” in *The Philosophy of Time*, ed. Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)

movement faster than this is something it does *as it goes on*" (37). For McTaggart, on the other hand, events are always changing, from the time in which they are in far future, through the present, and as they continue further into the past. The strangeness in the idea that events are changing is, therefore, relocated in strangeness about the nature of existence of the past and the future. In ordinary language, one would hesitate to say that something could change which does not exist, and, at the same time, one would also generally say, at least in a strict sense, that the past and the future do not exist.

In attempting to solve this problem, Prior introduces a new logical syntax that attempts to deal with the existence of the past and the future by adding temporal adverb predicates onto temporally-present function statements. I am of the opinion that the strange way in which we talk about the existence (or non-existence) of the past and future, and the way in which events can be said to be continually changing does not lie at heart in a linguistic problem, but instead at a temporally metaphysical problem, which leads to the addition of a 'personal' temporality in conjunction with the time series that McTaggart constructs. Now, this 'personal' temporality, we can loosely say, is one that stems from personal dealings within the world and finds its grounding through its relation to the way in which the subject exists. This 'personal' temporality can exist apart from the time series that McTaggart is attempting to frame and prove unreal. For the purposes of this argument, we will call the objective time series that McTaggart is attempting to describe 'time', or the 'time series', while on the other hand, we will call 'temporality' that which derives from the subject's existence within the world.

It appears intuitively safe to hold that change must take place in or on an existing object or event. With this in mind, we can say that if McTaggart wants to claim that

events can change throughout their histories, it is not the notion of change that needs expansion, but instead the notion of existence.²⁰ McTaggart is very explicit in his stance that change, and therefore time, can only happen to events while they are in existence. He writes:

Time only belongs to the existent. If any reality is in time, that involves that the reality in question exists. This, I imagine, would be universally admitted. It may be questioned whether all of what exists is in time, or even whether anything really existent is in time, but it would not be denied that, if anything is in time, it must exist. (*UT*: 465)

Following upon the quote given, if anything is to be in time, then it must exist. But in what way are we to say that the future exists, when, given the time-series as it is generally constructed, the past and the future are not in existence? And, furthermore, in what way are we to interpret the notion of events, or changes, changing? I believe that we can see this *stemming* from 'personal' temporality, which founds the time series as ordinarily conceived, and allows for a subject to place certain existence values (modes of being) on that which is not strictly in existence (this mode of being, as Heidegger would call it, is present-at-hand). For Heidegger, as we will see, the most primordial level of time, temporality, does not contain events. What I want to argue, however, is that world-time, which arises from a 'leveling' of temporality and is meaningful because of it, can satisfy this need to allow that events in the past and future exist. We have already seen a hint of this in the first section of this essay: the final interpretation that we gave of

²⁰ With the use of the terminology 'histories' of events, I am employing Prior's distinction, which he used as a defense of McTaggart against D.C. Broad. Prior claims there are two differing notions of history – that which happens within the time series, such as the history of an object, as well as the history of the terms in the series itself. For example, while an event may occur and only have a history – or a part of history – lasting a short while, the history of that event as a term in the time series consists of its moving from the distant future, to the present, and further into the past.

Aristotle's conception of time, which involved a stretching of the 'now' into the past and future. This stretching, which also involved "retaining" and "expecting," when taken in conjunction with Heidegger's totality of involvements that structure the world, can, to some degree, place certain modes of being on events that are not presently in existence. This is what Heidegger calls "world-time". We will discuss this in much greater detail in the next section, but for now we may conditionally claim that Heidegger's move to ground the time-series, which for McTaggart is constituted by the A-series, in something that is not on the level of the time-series itself may offer a way to speak of past and future events' existence and changing nature.

I believe we can see a partial realization of this fact on the part of McTaggart, who, in describing the characteristics of A-series, states that he believes that the characteristics of events as determinations of the A-series are relational, yet relational *to what* he cannot say. McTaggart writes:

[W]e take the terms of the A series as relations of events (which seems the more reasonable view)...in that case only one term of each relation can be event or a moment. The other terms must be something outside the time-series. For the relations of the A series are changing relations and the relation of terms of the time-series to one another do not change...The relations which form the A series then must be relations of events and moments to something not itself in the time-series. What this something is might be difficult to say. (UT: 467)

I would like to suggest that this relation stems from the relations that events *within* the time series have to the world-time individuals within the time series. This would satisfy both McTaggart's requirement that there be an existent individual within the time series whose token-reflexive statements built the temporal manifold, which we mentioned above, as well as explain how an event can be given existence outside of its

strict present existence and therefore, how events can change through some time other than the present.

§5. Idealist Conclusions

Before moving on to present a way in which Heidegger's work on time and temporality may be associated with Aristotle and McTaggart's view, we may wonder whether the best critique of any theory presented here is McTaggart himself, who sought to prove the non-existence of the time series in general. Without any such time series, we may wonder whether or not temporality matters at all. Following Michael Dummett²¹, I would like to suggest that the second part of McTaggart's argument, in which he claims that time is unreal, stems from a particular view on the nature of *reality* and, therefore, that there is not anything fundamentally flawed in the time-series that proves its unreality. Dummett claims that McTaggart, as an idealist philosopher, held that reality must be fully determined outside of any given perspective to constitute its existence. In other words, because McTaggart believed that a truly existent reality had to be one based on something completely independent of the subjective experience, and because he believed that time could not be constituted in this way, he claimed that time was unreal. It seems, therefore, that for McTaggart, 'unreal' means something like 'dependent, to some degree, on a subject- or perspective- based constitution'. As such, and because McTaggart's theory of the time series implicitly required token-reflexives and therefore an individual's

²¹ Michael Dummett, "A Defense of McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time," in *Time*, ed. Jonathan Westphal and Carl Levenson (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1993).

perspective when constructing the temporal manifold, McTaggart concluded that time was unreal. Dummett writes, “I think the point is that McTaggart is taking it for granted that reality must be something of which there exists in principle a complete description” (117). Because the time series exists without a complete description, or in other words, because, as we saw above, one cannot construct the time series from a God-like point of view, McTaggart concludes that time cannot exist. However, if we can let ourselves abandon this view of reality – that it must be fully constituted outside on any one perspective – I see no reason to reject the time series. We must only realize that it cannot be fully constituted outside of an individual’s existence. And, in my opinion, this inability to fully constitute the temporal series from outside an individual’s perspective ties in well with the notion of change being necessary for the time series. If change is a necessary attribute of the time series, it seems to suggest that some perspective must view the change. Otherwise, the motion of objects or events can simply be taken as a thing-in-itself. In other words, in order to confer change upon an object or event, one must be there to realize difference – for example, moving from existence to non-existence, or from present to past. Otherwise, without an individual present, the entire motion of object or events simply *is*, with no necessity of *change*.

§6. Summary

We have seen that McTaggart’s philosophy of time requires token-reflexive statements, which imply the existence of a subject within the time-series. Furthermore, we have seen that the necessity for changing an existent event throughout time requires

some sort of 'personal' temporality to make this intelligible. In the next section, we will make a further inquiry into Heidegger's temporal structure, which I believe can give a solution to McTaggart's implicit consequences. We have also shown that perhaps McTaggart's proof of the unreality of time is, at its heart, a view of reality, which we need not take for granted. It seems that if we accept the view that the reality of time need not be fully constituted from an outside perspective, McTaggart's proof falls away. However, this is not to say that McTaggart's theory with regards to time is unimportant. On the contrary, we have seen that the framework that McTaggart uses in his proof lends itself to phenomenological philosophies of temporality, which necessarily include individual's dealing with time and with the world. As such, McTaggart's philosophy of time becomes a crucial stepping-stone for developments of and support for theories involving 'personal' temporalities of existent individuals.

III

Heidegger, Temporality, and Being

§1. Ontology

As the title of this chapter suggests, Heidegger's theory of temporality is tied up very intimately within ontology. I believe, therefore, that we should begin with an overview of Heidegger's ontology, which follows the methodology employed in his magnum opus, *Being and Time*. Heidegger begins with two primary classes of entities: Dasein and 'innerworldly beings.' Within Heidegger's ontology, 'innerworldly beings' can be further parsed into two kinds of entities: substances and equipment. Substances, or 'things', are based upon traditional philosophy's notion of substance ontology, in which a thing objectively present has qualities that do not depend upon its situation. Heidegger specifically cites Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant as individuals who represent the paradigm for traditional philosophy. In Heidegger's opinion, the metaphysics exemplified by the school of traditional philosophy relies, at the most basic level, upon a subject/object distinction. He calls the mode of being of these beings 'objective presence,' or present-at-hand [*Vorhandenheit*]. A Present-at-hand object, which throughout philosophy's history has been roughly synonymous with 'existence', means, for Heidegger, a being that is independent of the worldly situation that it is 'occurent' in, and as such, it is an object with explicit, definable qualities. This mode of being, for

Heidegger, primarily shows itself within scientific investigation, and in our case, it shows up upon the abstraction of involvement and significance from temporality. Time, then, only becomes something intelligible as an empty, container-like structure of points.

The second being Heidegger formulates is equipment [*Zeug*], which has the mode of being of readiness-to-hand [*Zuhandenheit*]. And finally, the third being, Dasein, which (generally) corresponds to human entities, has the mode of being of *existence*. Heidegger holds that while the *entities* of the first two types of being do not depend on Dasein, their *mode* of being itself does (SZ: 183). In other words, while the equipment itself does not depend on Dasein, the readiness-to-hand, or the mode of being *of* the equipment, does. It is important to note that while the modalities present-at-hand and readiness-to-hand are separate from one another, this is due to the dependence of the modalities of being upon Dasein's existence within the world. They apply to the same class of entities, namely 'innerworldly beings,' as these are independent of Dasein.

In exposing the phenomena of the worldliness of the world, Heidegger focuses primarily on the being of equipment as ready-to-hand. As opposed to objective presence, the being of readiness-to-hand is encountered in Dasein's "everyday being-in-the-world, which we also call our '*dealings*' [*Umgang*] in the world *with* entities within-the-world" (SZ: 66/7). This everyday association in the world, and Dasein's dealings with equipment, cannot be characterized by some sort of perceptual cognition of the qualities of substances objectively present, but rather is "a handling, using, and taking care of things" (SZ: 68). This association takes its most primordial form when Dasein literally *uses* the equipment. Heidegger explicates two essential, though certainly not independent, aspects of equipment in the mode of being 'ready-to-hand.' First, equipment have in their

way of being an '*in-order-to*.' For example, a hammer has the '*in-order-to*' of hammering. Heidegger writes:

In dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinated itself to the "in-order-to" which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time; the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is – as equipment. (SZ: 69)

It is important to note the stress that Heidegger places on the actual *using* of the hammer, which brings its being to the most primordial and genuine ready-to-hand. In a sense, as Heidegger writes, the hammer is restored to its true ready-to-hand through its *withdrawing* as a hammer *per se*. In other words, when Dasein is absorbed in the world and dealing non-cognitively with equipment, the hammer *withdraws*, or becomes transparent as a 'hammer,' and becomes a primordial equipment '*in-order-to*' pound nails. Heidegger writes:

The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of things that circumspection takes proximally as a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our everyday dealing proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work. (SZ: 69)

The structure of this '*in-order-to*' brings Heidegger to the second essential aspect of the mode of being of readiness-to-hand: that belonging to the referential totality of equipment. This reference however, is not anything characterized linguistically; instead, it is the implicit pointing towards other equipment (and other Daseins, for that matter) contained in the interdependence of equipment. Put another way, the totality of all equipment must be given in advance of any one particular thing, and all equipment contains within its being a 'to hand' reference to the totality of all other equipment. To

keep with the example of hammering, a ‘hammer’ as an equipment can only make sense within the totality of equipment such as nails, wood, frames, houses, and so on. Without such reference, a hammer would simply be taken as some thing objectively present – an object with qualities. For some ‘thing’ to be a ‘hammer,’ it must have ‘*in-order-to(s)*’ that reference the whole of equipment.

Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as *an* equipment. To the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is.²² (SZ: 68)

These two aspects taken together – the primary ‘*in-order-to*’ of equipment and the belonging to a referential totality – allows Heidegger to make a further claim regarding Dasein’s role within the referential totality. The referential whole of ‘*in-order-to*’ eventually finds its final ‘*in-order-to*’ within Dasein’s ‘*for-the-sake-of-which*,’ in which Dasein takes a stand on its being. This final ‘*for-the-sake-of-which*’ is the stage where no further involvement exists within the referents. In other words, while the equipment of hammer has the primary ‘*in-order-to*’ of pounding nails (which can be drawn out into further ‘*in-order-to(s)*,’ such as building a wall and building a house), this must eventually lead to the final referent for which Dasein employs the ‘hammer’ as equipment, which is to say, to take a stand on its being. He writes:

But the ‘*for-the-sake-of*’ always pertains to the being of Dasein, for which, in its being, that very being is essentially an *issue*. We have thus indicated the interconnection by which the structure of an involvement leads to Dasein’s very being as the sole authentic ‘*for-the-sake-of-which*’. (SZ: 84)

For example, in the case of the hammer, this may be to take some stand as ‘being a carpenter’ or ‘being a shelterer.’ Now, it is important to note that this is certainly not a

²² Again, Heidegger writes: “Equipment – in accordance with its equipmentality – always is *in terms of* its belonging to other equipment” (SZ: 68).

conscious decision on the part of Dasein; one does not employ equipment for the explicit *purpose* of taking a reasoned stand on one's being. Instead, this stand comes inseparably alongside the use of equipment, as it is only *through* this use that Dasein comes to understand its being. As we will see, these two differing, though interrelated involvements – the involvement of any one equipment with the totality and the involvement of the 'for-the-sake-of-which' in that totality – correspond to the two differing forms of *understanding* that Heidegger claims discloses, or opens, Dasein's own potentiality-for-being (SZ: 144).

In sum, we can say that equipment must have more than an '*in-order-to*;' to *be* what they 'are' they must also have a referential part in the whole of equipment. Equipment is *truly and most primordially* equipment *when it is being used*, and this is how Dasein relates in its being of existence to equipment. At the most absorbed (and basic) level, when Dasein is simply dealing with an equipment, it becomes less and less noticeable, and functions as *withdrawing*. We may say confidently, then, that 'an equipment' ceases to be what it is when it becomes isolated and no longer has a reference to, or is part of, the whole. Equipment, then, is necessarily within the referential totality most primordially when it is in use and withdrawing (that is, in the mode of being ready-to-hand).

Heidegger holds that it is when Dasein comes across equipment in the way of being *un-ready-to-hand* that the referential whole of the '*in-order-to(s)*' is revealed. In other words, within Dasein's non-cognitive dealings in the world, the equipmental whole exists and is understood, but not made intelligible. On the other hand, when this dealing in the world is interrupted, Dasein is made to realize the necessary determination that the

whole has upon the particular equipment. For example, it is only when the hammer 'breaks' that Dasein realizes that there exists an explicit equipment used for pounding nails. Until the breakdown, the hammer, as equipment *withdrawing*, is simply given as a general equipment '*in-order-to*' pound nails. I believe we can make sense of this with the semantic difference of Dasein's viewing the 'hammer' as a 'nail-pounder,' when circumspectively dealing within the world, as opposed to an explicit 'hammer-tool for pounding nails' after the interruption, when the equipment is given in the mode of *un-ready-to-hand*. In Dasein's encountering the *un-ready-to-hand*, Heidegger holds that Dasein is met with an equipmental entity that has neither the mode of being of readiness-to-hand, nor pure presence-at-hand, as a substance would. Instead, he holds that Dasein encounters presence-at-hand alongside readiness-to-hand. He writes:

Un-readiness-to-hand...implies that what cannot be used just lies there; it shows itself as an equipmental Thing which looks so and so, and which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking that way, has constantly been present-at-hand too. Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment, but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something with which one concerns oneself...This presence-at-hand of something that cannot be used is still not devoid of all readiness-to-hand whatsoever; equipment which is present-at-hand *in this way* is still not just a Thing which occurs somewhere. (SZ: 73)

Throughout these sections in which Heidegger discusses the relationship between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand, I take him to be positing a bivalent relationship. First, to some degree we can see that the being of present-at-hand underlies the ready-to-hand. This relationship seemingly has the quality of some form of 'weak causal determination.' In other words, if the present-at-hand, or the substance with certain de-situated qualities did not exist, neither would the ready-to-hand equipment. This relationship comes to the fore as Heidegger discusses the necessary 'suitability' of

equipment. Not all substances can be hammers, only those with the substantial qualities of medium-length, a hard head, and so on. In another way, however, we must view the relationship between the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand as one in which the ready-to-hand must underlie the present-at-hand. This relationship seemingly holds the quality of *intelligibility*. This must be the case, as no sort of substantial qualities can make a ‘hammer-Thing’ a ‘hammer.’ In other words, no matter how suitable some set of qualities given to a substance are for the making of a hammer, a ‘hammer’ is only one insofar as it exists within the referential totality. As such, the present-at-hand being of substance, such as a hammer, is only intelligible through Dasein’s dealing with hammers *qua* equipment. Therefore, we may conclude that the modes of being of present-at-hand and ready-to-hand mutually found, although in differing ways, each other.

The third mode of being that Heidegger explicates, and the one that he is most concerned with is the mode of being of Dasein, namely, *existence*. Dasein is first described as “an entity for which, in its being, that being is an issue” (SZ: 191). This definition is initially sought through an analysis of the phenomenon of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, which is constituted by the ontological characteristics of “existentiality, facticity, and being-fallen” (SZ: 191). Heidegger then reformulates this being-in-the-world as a particular instance, along with being-with-others, of the existential totality of Dasein. The existential totality is formulated in this way: “the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)” (SZ: 192). To this formal ontologico-existential structure, Heidegger gives the term *care* [*Sorge*]. For Heidegger, care is the meaning of Dasein. In *Being and Time*, the term ‘meaning’ has a very distinctive definition: “‘Meaning’ signifies the

“upon-which” [das Woraufhin] of a primary projection in terms of which something can be conceived in its possibility as that which it is” (SZ: 324). In other words, meaning is that on the basis of which something becomes intelligible. As we have already seen, the being of an entity is that which makes the entity intelligible. Similarly, the care structure is that on the basis of which Dasein becomes intelligible. It is only in terms of *care* that Dasein can be grasped, or made intelligible, as that sort of being which it is. Heidegger writes, “Care, as a primordial structural totality, lies ‘before’ every factual ‘attitude’ and ‘situation’ of Dasein, and it does so existentially *a priori*” (SZ: 193). Care is the *meaning* of Dasein.

The care-structure contains three elements, the being-ahead-of-itself, which Heidegger characterized as *existence*, the already-in-the-world, *facticity*, and the being-alongside entities within-the-world, *falling*. Furthermore, these three ontological characteristics, which form the unity of the whole of care, have three corresponding ways in which they are disclosed (or opened): understanding discloses existence, state-of-mind discloses facticity, and dealing²³ discloses falling. For the sake of this paper, any difference in the two constitutive elements – that, for example, *understanding* is a phenomenological *state* of Being corresponding to the existential element which founds

²³ Heidegger generally uses the term falling on both levels, both as that which is disclosed as the existential characteristic and as that which does the disclosing. Therefore, although I have written ‘dealing’ (the term that Heidegger uses more rarely) here for the sake of clarity, I will, for the rest of the essay, simply use the term ‘falling’, as we will only focus on the disclosing level of Heidegger’s work.

it, *existence* – are irrelevant. We can focus on the names of the elements involved in the disclosing – understanding, state-of-mind [*Befindlichkeit*], and falling (SZ: 334/5)²⁴.

§2. The Care Structure

Heidegger characterizes the disclosive elements of the care structure in Division I of *Being and Time* during an analysis of Dasein's primary state of being, being-in-the-world. The care structure, although it is the formal existential totality of Dasein's way of being, does not, for Heidegger, constitute, in itself, the proper *unity* that is necessary for a complete analysis of Dasein. This *unity* comes with temporality: "*The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality*" (SZ: 327). Temporality is the *meaning* of care, or, temporality is the structure that makes care, which in its formulation supposes a unity, intelligible. In order to show how this unity exposes itself, we will briefly analyze each structural element of care, and then, as they correspond to the three temporal ecstases, we will expose temporality. From temporality, the primordial time, we may move on to discuss 'world-time', which we found both in our interpretations of Aristotle and McTaggart, as well as 'now-time', or the ordinary conception of time, which is the structure that both Aristotle and McTaggart began their theories supposing.

The first structural element of care, being-ahead-of-itself, is disclosed in understanding. In Heidegger's exposition of understanding, two different, though interrelated, significations arise. Although Heidegger does not always differentiate

²⁴ Heidegger also mentions 'discourse' as a structure that constitutes disclosedness. However, as discourse, is not relegated to any particular ecstasis of temporality, it will not be discussed here.

between the two when generally discussing understanding, he does, at certain points, use the terms 'primary', or what we will call *basic* understanding for the first, and '*primordial*' understanding for the second. The basic way of understanding particularly relates to the ontological term *concern*, which is Dasein's way of being towards the world. Heidegger writes, "Because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world is essentially concern" (SZ: 57). Concern, or Dasein's way of being-in-the-world, is grounded in *care*. As such, the disclosive elements of *care* – understanding, state-of-mind, and falling – are also the constitutive elements of *concern*. Care, as the fundamental structure of Dasein, is more primordial than concern, as it is only on the basis of Dasein existing in such a way (*care*) that it can exist as being-in-the-world. Furthermore, while the elements of *care* correspond to the unity of *temporality*, these same elements, characterized in a different way (*concern*), correspond to *world-time*. With respect to understanding, the *basic* understanding relates to concern, or Dasein's being-in-the-world, while primordial understanding relates to care, or Dasein's structural way of being as that entity for which its being is an issue.

Now, with our basis in Heidegger's ontology, which we examined above, we can analyze Dasein's understanding (in both senses) along the lines of projection: "the understanding projects Dasein's Being both upon the "for-the-sake-of-which" and upon significance, as the worldhood of its current world" (SZ: 185). The basic understanding involves Dasein's projection upon significance, which is equipmental totality of involvement that is made up of the ready-to-hand entities.²⁵ As we saw above, there can

²⁵ "Dasein, in its familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world of involvement (readiness-to-

be no such thing as a single piece of equipment, and basic understanding is the way in which Dasein non-thematically grasps this whole and is able to use equipment. Understanding is projection onto significance, which means the way that Dasein, in its familiarity with the totality of equipment (which must be given before any particular one piece can be encountered) can respond to the equipment, use it in its transparent dealings with the world. Heidegger writes: "In terms of the significance which is disclosed in understanding the world, concerned Being-alongside the ready-to-hand gives itself to understand whatever involvement that which is encountered can have" (SZ: 148). For example, in order to use the hammer, as it is known in itself, which is to say, known in its *being* a hammer, requires that we know the totality of involvements that the hammer references – nails, houses, ect. – and it is only on the basis of basic understanding that this totality can be given. As we recall from above, the totality of involvements essentially leads back to a final 'for-the-sake-of-which' that belongs to the being of Dasein. This 'for-the-sake-of-which' designates Heidegger's other way of discussing understanding, primordial understanding. The 'for-the-sake-of-which' is that upon which Dasein projects, in understanding, towards some 'potentiality-for-being' (SZ 143/4). In other words, potentiality-for-being is that being which Dasein understands itself as. For example, were my 'for-the-sake-of-which' to be a carpenter, I would be projecting onto a potentiality-for-being such that I understood myself as a carpenter. Thus, we can see how intimately related these two understandings (basic and primordial) are: in understanding myself as a carpenter, I structure my involvements such that I use equipment that is for carpentry, which is based upon my understanding of the equipmental whole. Conversely,

hand) as their kind of Being, and which can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves" (SZ: 87).

and simultaneously, I use the equipment appropriate for carpentry such that I understand myself as a carpenter. As above, we must stress that these projections upon a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ are not cognitive, but are instead a way of being. For it is not that I decide to understand myself as a carpenter and then set about using the appropriate tools, but instead, I can only understand myself as a carpenter while *being* a carpenter, which involves using the tools that belong to the equipmental whole.

The second element of the care structure, and consequently, of the structure of concern, is state-of-mind. As with understanding, state-of-mind also contains two related conceptions. The first, *thrownness* belongs to the existential constitution of care, while the second, what we will simply call state-of-mind, belongs to being-in-the-world of equipments. As to the existential constitution, thrownness designates Dasein’s ‘that it is and has to be.’ In other words, the fact of Dasein’s being delivered over into Being, or its existence, is something that Dasein has found itself as, something essential to be as it is, namely being. *Thrownness* signifies the fact that Dasein must always already exist as found in order to find itself; it is always on the basis of its thrownness that it can be. Heidegger writes, “As an entity which has been delivered over to its Being, it remains so delivered over to the fact that it must always have found itself – but found itself in a way of finding which arises not so much from a direct seeking...” (SZ: 135). This element of concern designates the fact that, Dasein, as existence, cannot get behind its own fact of existence. Dasein’s thrownness is also present in Dasein’s being-in-the-world. It shows itself in dealing with ready-to-hand equipment insofar as state-of-mind is the basis for any piece of equipment to show up as *mattering*. It is only on the basis of entities within the world mattering to Dasein that it can take them up and use, and as such, because

Dasein is defined in its being by what it does, Dasein, as such, can only *be* by things *mattering* to it. In his essay “Temporality”, William Blattner writes of this mattering:

This determinateness [of facticity, or thrownness into existence] discloses itself to Dasein through affectivity [Blattner’s translation of *Befindlichkeit*, or state-of-mind], which is the way things matter to Dasein. Everything Dasein encounters, from the most significant and oppressive events of one’s life, to the most trivial and irrelevant, matter to it...That I am someone determinate or concrete, that I am situated in an ongoing life, in a time and place, rather than just being an abstraction, manifest itself to me in the way in which things matter to me. (*Tp*: 313)²⁶

Thrownness, therefore, is a structural element necessary for Dasein’s being, or in other words, it is an element of care. Mattering, an element of concern, Dasein’s being towards the world, is a manifestation grounded on this element. Similarly basic understanding is a manifestation grounded on primordial understanding.

As for falling, however, the being-alongside of entities within the world, the difference between the existential level and the level of concerned being-in-the-world is one that shows itself in the differing connections with the other elements in each respective structure. Therefore, we will arrive at this difference in discussing Heidegger’s differing levels of time. For now, we can characterize falling as the absorption in the world of equipment, or in other words, the using of particular equipment. We have seen that state-of-mind is that on the basis of which these are encountered as mattering, and we have seen that basic understanding is that non-cognitive grasping of the equipmental whole necessary for encountering any particular equipment. Falling, then, is the *encounter*, or the use of that particular equipment.²⁷ Heidegger does use the term falling

²⁶ William Blattner, “Temporality” in *A Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (Blackwell Publishing, 2005)

²⁷ William Blattner writes, “[Falling] names Dasein’s essential encounter with and absorption in non-human things in the course of pursuing possibilities. Equipment,

to designate another, un-related, phenomenon – that tendency to fall from authentic being into the world of das Man – so we must be careful to distinguish falling as the structural element of being-in-the-world and falling as being inauthentic.

§ 3. Temporality

On the basis of the previous explanation of the three elements of *care* (and, by proxy, of *concern*), we can encounter the *meaning* of care – temporality. Heidegger defines temporality as such:

Understanding is grounded primarily in the future (whether in anticipation or in awaiting). States-of-mind temporalize themselves primarily in having been (whether in repetition or in having forgotten). Falling has its temporal roots primarily in the Present (whether in making-present or the moment of vision). All the same, understanding is in every case a Present which ‘is in the process of having been’. All the same, one’s state-of-mind temporalized itself as a future which is ‘making present’. All the same, the Present ‘leaps away’ from a future that is in the process of having been, or else it is held on to by such a future. Thus we can see that *in every ecstasis, temporality temporalizes itself as a whole; and this means that in the ecstatical unity with which temporality has fully temporalized itself currently, is grounded the totality of the structural whole of existence, facticity, and falling – that is, the unity of the care-structure.* (SZ: 350).

Although extraordinarily complicated, this quotation shows that temporality is the *unity* of the care structure that we have examined. The primordial future is united with the primordial past and primordial present. Likewise, the other two ecstases are united with their temporal counterparts. In what way are we to interpret this? First, we must make note of the fact that as temporality is the meaning of the care structure, it involves the

paraphernalia, gear (*das Zeug*) are available (*zuhanden*) to Dasein as it goes about its daily business” (*Tp*: 313).

three structural elements that we have designated as constituting that structure: primordial understanding (grounded in the future), thrownness (grounded in the having been), and falling (grounded in the making-present). This means, then, that the ahead-of-itself focuses on the primordial understanding of projection upon Dasein's 'for-the-sake-of-which' and the already-in-the-world signifies the thrownness in its 'that it is and has to be'.

While being-ahead-of-itself certainly suggest a futural component, Heidegger warns us not to take this as something in the future such that, as a possibility, it may, at some 'now', become actual. Likewise, the primordial past does not suggest something that once actualizes and is not running off into the non-existent past. He writes, "With this 'before' [in primordial temporality] we do not have in mind 'in advance of something' [*das "Vorher"*] in the sense of 'not yet now—but later'; the 'already' is just as far from signifying 'no longer now—but earlier'" (SZ: 327). In fact, by the primordial future, Heidegger is not speaking of *events* at all, but Dasein's potentialities-for-Being, which can only remain possible insofar as they 'are' at all. "By the term 'futural', we do not here have in view a "now" which has *not yet* become 'actual' and which sometime *will be* for the first time. We have in view the coming [*Kunft*] in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself" (SZ: 325). In other words, the potentialities that are futural are not something to be actualized in the present. These potentialities are not some future goal that relates to what I am doing now in the sense that I try and achieve it. Instead, as we have seen in Dasein's 'for-the-sake-of-which', they are always some self-understanding that constantly *structures* my involvements and understanding, by which I can only understand myself as that potentiality through the

involvements with-in which I am currently operating. Blattner writes, “An existential possibility [potentiality-for-being] is a manner of self-understanding with which one is indentified in virtue of pressing ahead into it” (*Tp*: 314). Blattner then goes on to expose the distinction between a possibility becoming actualized and a potentiality-for-being though the example of social status. I believe that we can see the distinction in the difference between the social status of becoming a teacher and the potentiality-for-being an instructor. A teacher is some event in the future that can be actualized with the proper education, job, ect. However, an instructor is not something that can ever be accomplished. Instead, it is a *way of being* that, although always looming ahead, is never something that can be over and done. Even if one were to accomplish the status of being a teacher, *understanding* yourself as an instructor is a potentiality that constantly structures your involvements and understandings of the world, and is always something that one can press ahead into, but never wholly fulfill.

Another example of this phenomenon is Dasein’s being-towards-death, which for Heidegger is the Dasein’s ownmost potentiality: that is, the possibility of no further possibilities. Now in one sense, insofar as Dasein *is*, its death is not present. For, when that present-at-hand event takes place, Dasein will not *be* to experience it. The event is not something that can ever *come* for Dasein. But, for Heidegger, being-towards-death is not something such that Dasein recognizes the not-yet-now nature of death, but instead it exemplifies the paradigm of authentic existence. In this way, death is *not* some thing in the non-existent future, but is instead a potentiality that structures Dasein’s life. As such, in embracing a possibility *as* a possibility, Dasein structures authentic life as self-choosing (away from *das Man*). Heidegger writes in *History of the Concept of Time*:

Rather, if death is indeed a character of the being of Dasein, it cannot be conceived in its sense of being primarily in terms of the being-on-hand or not-being-on-hand of world-things. As care, Dasein is rather being toward something. Death is not something which is still outstanding in Dasein. Death does not stand out in Dasein, but *stands before* Dasein in its being, and constantly at that, as long as it is Dasein. In other words, death is always already *impending*. As such, death belongs to Dasein itself even when it is not yet whole and not yet finished, even when it is not dying. (*History of the Concept of Time*: 312/313)

Being-towards-death is a particular sort of living, one in which Dasein structures its present involvements within the world in light of, yet death, as an event, is never something that can *occur*. The primordial future as a potentiality-for-being, then, is a *unity*, along with the primordial present and the primordial past: on the basis of thrownness, or state-of-mind, entities within the world matter to Dasein such that it acts, and in acting, which, for Heidegger, is equivalent to being, Dasein necessarily takes a stand on it being, or has a self-understanding. Were there no primordial past, nothing would matter on which to act. In addition, if there were not primordial future, there would be no involvement through which to act. Thus, there is the ecstatic unity of temporality.

Likewise, as the ahead-of-itself designates a future that is not an event not-yet-now, so does the already-in-the-world, the primordial past, designate something that never *was* in the present in the no-longer-now. The primordial past, Dasein's thrownness, is not some event that has taken place in Dasein's sequential past. Instead, it is a way of being such that one cannot be the basis for one's own being. Dasein can *never be* the basis of its own being, or of its own state-of-mind. Yet, it is always *in* as state-of-mind, and as such, it is a particular being that is not the basis of that particularity. In other words, it is not as if *thrownness* is some event, for example being born, upon which one

then becomes the basis of its own being. Instead, *thrownness* is the continual null basis upon which one's existence is founded. Blattner writes,

[A]ttunements [states-of-mind], however, are not past events. They do not belong to the sequential past, as the various episodes of my life-history do. In Heidegger's language, they are not "bygone" (*vergangen*). They belong, rather, to the existential, or originary [primordial] past, to my "beenness" (*Gewesenheit*). My attunements were not at some time present, after which they slipped into the past. Rather, at every moment that an attunement characterized me, even at the first moment, I am already thrown into it; it is already past. (*Tp*: 315)

In viewing primordial past, we can again see the ecstatic unity of temporality. Heidegger writes, "only as long as Dasein is, *can it be* as having been" (*SZ*: 328). Only because Dasein is primordially present can it understand itself as having a primordial past. On the basis of encountering entities in the future, Dasein has a self-understanding, and as such, and it is only on the basis of a primordial past (*thrownness*) that it can encounter entities within the primordial present. Heidegger writes, "In existing, it has been thrown; and as something thrown, it has been delivered over to entities which it needs *in order to* be able to be as it is – namely, *for the sake of itself*" (*SZ*: 364).

The primordial present, or encountering entities, has the character of letting entities be involved. By this, we mean that Dasein, as the being upon which all being is founded, is the basis for which entities have the mode of being of ready-to-hand. This involvement in the totality of equipment, as we mention, is for Dasein, the making-present. Yet, entities can only *be* involved insofar as there is a totality of equipment, and this is founded on there being equipment at all. The primordial present, therefore, is the existential element of care in which Dasein allows entities to belong to a totality of equipment. And, again, it is only on the basis of the primordial past, *thrownness*, and the primordial future, *primordial* understanding, or potentiality-for-being, that Dasein takes

up entities as ready-to-hand. Thus, there is, once more, a unity of the ecstases in Heidegger's characterization of temporality.

§ 4. World-Time (and Now-Time)

Now, it is certainly the case that the temporality examined above is not the sort of thing that we generally associate with time. Yet, Heidegger calls temporality the primordial time (SZ: 329). In his essay on Heideggerian temporality, William Blattner goes so far as to question (only for pedagogical reasons, it seems) why Heidegger calls the unity as the meaning of the care structure time at all. The answer to this, for Heidegger, lies in the notion of intelligibility. Time, as is ordinarily conceived, contains many features –continuity, directedness (or successiveness), publicness – which, as we have seen in the course of this essay, are complicated issues to interpret with regard to the nature of time. For Heidegger, however, the intelligibility of these features, which are difficult to grasp on the ordinary concept of time, comes about in time's groundedness and association with temporality. He writes:

If, therefore, we demonstrate that the 'time' which is accessible to Dasein's common sense is *not* primordial, but arises rather from authentic temporality, then, in accordance with the principle, "*a potiori fit denominatio*", we are justified in designating as "*primordial time*" the *temporality* which we have now laid bare. (SZ: 329)

Heidegger designates two ways in which we encounter time in our everyday lives: world-time and now-time (or time as it is ordinarily conceived). Including temporality, these three different levels of time correspond, I take it, to the three modes of being that constitute Heidegger's ontology: temporality to Dasein's way of being, care (as we have

shown), world-time to readiness-to-hand, and now-time as presence-at-hand. World-time is the time structure in which entities within the world are encountered, and as such, it is the series of significant events that center around Dasein's being-in-the-world. Now-time, or time as it is normally conceived, is a pure "sequence of 'nows' which are constantly 'present-at-hand', simultaneously passing away and coming along. [Now-]Time is understood as a succession, as a 'flowing stream' of "nows", as the 'course of time'" (SZ: 422). Now-time, as we have seen in our exegesis of both Aristotle and McTaggart, is the conception of time normally theorized upon in both everyday and philosophical discourses. However, through our interpretation of both Aristotle and McTaggart, we have also shown their dependence on a conception of world-time. For Aristotle, this appeared in reference to the *earlier* and *later* (not before and after) of motion, as well as the *stretching* of the 'now'. For McTaggart, this appeared in both the necessity of token-reflexive statements, which in turn necessitates Dasein, and the idea of events changing while not being present-at-hand. Therefore, we shall focus the rest of this essay on world-time, as this seems to be the force involved in our overall analysis, and leave now-time, for the most part, as something unexplored.

The relationship that the different time series have with each other is one founded on meaning and intelligibility. This corresponds to the way in which we have previously discussed the present-at-hand being founded upon the ready-to-hand. In that case, it is only through Dasein's involvement with the totality of ready-to-hand equipment that it can abstract to the present-at-hand being of substance with context-independent qualities. The ready-to-hand is not something that is added onto the present-at-hand entities as a further quality, but is the only way in which they become encounterable by Dasein; that is

to say, it is only on the basis of their being ready-to-hand that they are encounterable as such. Likewise, I believe there is a similar relationship between the three time structures: the now-time is only intelligible, or meaningful, on the basis of the world-time, and world-time is only intelligible on the basis of temporality, or primordial time. At each different structure, there is a leveling (or degeneration) of complexity that takes place.

Heidegger writes:

We have accordingly called the time with which we concern ourselves “*world-time*”. In the ordinary interpretations of time as a sequence of “nows”, both datability and significance are *missing*. These two structures are *not* permitted to ‘come to the fore’ when time is characterized as pure succession. The ordinary interpretation of time *covers them up*. When these are covered up, the ecstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality, in which the datability and the significance of the “nows” are grounded, get *levelled off*. (SZ: 422).

As mentioned in the above passage, the relationship of intelligibility carries with it, for Heidegger, the relationship for *foundation*. Thus, both world-time and now-time are founded upon temporality and now-time is founded upon world-time.²⁸

World-time, as “that time ‘wherein’ entities within-the-world are encountered”, is that time based upon involvements that Dasein has with the world. It has the characteristics of being measured and ordered, along with significance, a span (or stretch), datability, and publicness. As we saw in Aristotle, world-time places a particular importance on the ‘now’: “The ‘then’ and the ‘on that former occasion’ are understood with regard to a ‘now’; that is to say, making present as a peculiar importance” (SZ:

²⁸ Heidegger points out this foundational relationship when he writes, “The kind of ‘time’ which is first found ontically in within-time-ness [world-time], becomes the basis on which the ordinary traditional conception of time takes form. But time, as within-time-ness, arises from an essential kind of temporalizing of primordial temporality” (SZ: 333).

406/7). World-time also has the characteristic of *datability*, which we saw in Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's conception of time. Heidegger writes:

The *datability* of the 'now', the 'then', and the 'on that former occasion', reflects the *ecstatical* constitution of temporality, and is *therefore* essential for the time itself that has been expressed. The structure of the *datability* of the 'now', the 'then', and the 'on that former occasion', is evidence that these, *stemming from temporality, are themselves time*. The interpretive expressing of the 'now', the 'then' and the 'on that former occasion', is the most primordial way of *assigning a time*. (SZ: 408).

With Aristotle, this *datability* amounted to assigning the 'now' to the movement or motion of an object in time. Similarly, within Heidegger's conception of world-time, structure of *datability* placing of time determinations upon events and objects within the world of involvements. Any 'now' corresponds, as world-time is such that it is tied up in the totality of equipment and its 'in-order-to's', to events or objects that are *significant* for Dasein. World-time is the time in which Dasein encounters entities within the world. This time, therefore, also has the characteristic of significance, in accord with the fact that the totality of equipmental involvements constitutes significance; world-time *matters* to Dasein.

As we have seen, the primordial present is that in which entities are encountered, or in other words, it is that *ecstasis* in which Dasein lets entities be involved. As Heidegger writes, "The horizontal schema for the *Present* is defined by the "in-order-to" (SZ: 365). The difference in the primordial present and that present which belongs to concerned being-in-the-world lies in a different connectedness between their respective ecstases. In the primordial present, there was a *unity* of ecstases in which Dasein's primordial future, potentiality-for-being and Dasein's primordial past, thrownness were involved. In world-time, the present is constituted solely by Dasein's involvement with

the world, and as such, the present is cut off, or leveled off, from any connection with the existential elements of the care structure. As world-time is the time of circumspective concern, however, the world-time present is not cut off from the world-time future or the world-time past. This connection – that between the world-time present and the world-time past and future – involves *continuity*, which according to Heidegger, is a leveling of *unity*. This means, I believe, that although the world-time ecstases are not united into one structural whole, they do hold significant influence over each other. That they influence each other shows itself in the characteristic of spanning, which we will discuss below. In spanning, the true continuity of world-time is revealed. The world-time, or concerned being in the world future, we recall, is the basic understanding of the totality of equipment, while the concerned past is the mattering upon which entities are encountered within the world. Thus, in world-time, there exists a past in which something is encountered as mattering, and a future which is involved in the totality of equipment, namely, the ‘in-order-to’. As we encountered in Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle, what shows itself in this analysis of world-time is the “retaining” and “awaiting” (or “expecting”). In Aristotle, this involved the motion of an object along dimensional trajectory of places. With regards to the being-in-the-world, this means the awaiting of the “in-order-to” or the “towards which” and the retaining of the mattering for which some particular equipment is involved in Dasein’s absorbed dealing in the world (the world-time making-present). Heidegger writes:

Letting something be involved is implied in the simplest handling of an item of equipment. That which we let it be involved in has the character of a “towards-which”; with regards to this, the equipment is either usable or in use. The understanding of the “towards-which” – that is, the understanding of what the equipment is involved in – has the temporal structure of awaiting. In awaiting the “towards-which”, concern can at the

same time come back by itself to the sort of thing in which it is involved. The *awaiting* of what it is involved in, and – together with this awaiting – the *retaining* of that which is thus involved, make possible in the ecstatical unity the specifically manipulative way in which equipment is made present. (SZ: 353).

This means, for Heidegger, that although the making-present of world-time is cut off from the primordial future and primordial past, there is still a deep relationship between the world-time future and the world-time past. In making-present, or letting some entity be involved, Dasein awaits the future (as the “in-order-to” of the equipment) and retains the past (as the mattering of the equipment for which we used it). Together, the particular equipment that we are using (the past mattering), along with the totality of equipment and their interrelation with one another (the future ‘in-order-to’), constitutes the making-present in a way that “makes possible the characteristic of absorption of concern in its equipmental whole” (SZ: 354).

This makes possible our last comparison with Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle – the spanning, or stretching and continuity of the ‘now’. First, we can take notice of the fact that Heidegger too, after discussing the awaiting and retaining of circumspective concern, follows in Aristotle’s footsteps by particularly defining the ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ as that specifically temporal determination of motion, or as we can formulate it in the equipmental whole, a particular line of involvements, that leads back to Dasein’s ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, and depends on the ‘now’ with great emphasis: “The horizon of the retaining which expresses itself in the ‘on-that-former-occasion’ is the ‘earlier’; the horizon for the ‘then’ is the ‘later on’ (‘that which is to come’); the horizon for the ‘now’ is the ‘today’” (SZ: 407). Already in this last passage, we can see Heidegger hinting at the spanning or stretching of the now. In awaiting, Dasein assigns a ‘then’, or

as we saw it formulated in Aristotle, an 'after'. The awaiting that takes place is understood as an 'until-then', or as it is interpreted by Dasein, as an 'in-between'.

Heidegger writes:

'Enduring' gets Articulated in the understanding one has of the 'during' when one awaits and makes present. This lasting [*Dauern*] in turn, is the time which is manifest in temporality's interpretation of *itself*; in our concern this time thus gets currently, but unthematically, understood as a 'span' ["Spanne"]. The making-present with awaits and retains, lays 'out' a 'during' *with a span*...Not only does the 'during' have a span; but every 'now', 'then' and 'on that former occasion' has, with its datability-structure, its own spanned character, with the width of the span varying: 'now'-in the intermission...[ect.] (SZ: 409).

Because Dasein is not simply making-present at two fixed points which correspond to the use of an equipment and its 'in-order-to', there is an awaiting and retaining. This awaiting signifies a pointed directionality *towards* the 'in-order-to'. Furthermore, Dasein is continually making-present, and as the equipment is directional, it is always pointing *towards* the world-time future. This continuous pointing towards, this notion of becoming in the direction of the 'in-order-to' constitutes, for Heidegger, the spanning of time. The making-present, as that pointing between the retaining (temporally *earlier*) and the awaiting (temporally *future*), *spans* or *stretches* the 'now'. In other words, the use of any singular piece of equipment does not constitute an instantaneous 'now' in world-time. Instead, it is only on the basis of the mattering and the 'in-order-to' that the making use, or making-present, of equipment is possible. Therefore, the making-present involves, and is intimately connected with, the world-time future of the 'in-order-to' and the world-time past of the mattering. Furthermore, this connection is not *any* relation, but spanning constitutes *continuity* between the past and the future. Again, the spanned 'now' of world-time is not disconnected from world-time past and future, but contains the *from*

there-to here relationship that we saw in Aristotle. The continuity of the ‘now’ involves the continuity of Dasein’s being-in-the-world – the equipmental whole is given, out of which a singular piece draw Dasein to act in its mattering, and through which we make use of that equipment. None of these world-time ecstases are disconnected, just as none of the constituting parts of being-in-the-world are. Further, this *spanning* of the ‘now’ is that which gets leveled off, along with the significance of world-time (for that arises out of the involvement with equipment), in the now-time, which is conceived as a pure succession of present-at-hand ‘nows’ existing next to one another.

§5. Coda

The final topic to cover in our analysis is Heidegger’s relationship to J.M.E. McTaggart’s philosophy of time. First, we have seen that McTaggart’s conception requires Dasein to exist within the time-series (as one giving the token-reflexive statement ‘now’), which is, in this case, world-time on Heidegger’s conception. With regard to Heidegger, we have also seen this necessity: world-time is that time in which entities are encountered, which is to say, that in which the totality of significant equipment lies. Dasein is required to be in world-time – being alongside entities ready-to-hand and using them – in order for world-time to be constituted through the spanning and continuous relationship between the world-time past and future. Furthermore, world-time past and future are only possible with regard to Dasein’s being. This totality is structured upon the entities being ready-to-hand and mattering for Dasein. The mattering is grounded upon Dasein’s thrownness and the understanding is grounded upon Dasein’s

primordial understanding. And ultimately, as we saw above, even the mode of *being* of readiness-to-hand is dependent on Dasein. This involvement with the totality of equipment is also grounded in the assigning of the ‘now’ as Dasein awaits the ‘in-order-to’ of the ready-to-hand equipment and retains its particular mattering. This awaiting and retaining, as we have shown, requires an implicit reference to the making-present. We must note that for Heidegger, the making-present does not necessarily involve a verbal utterance, but only an encountering of entities for employment. Thus, both Heidegger and McTaggart require Dasein’s existence within world-time.

Secondly, we can formulate the way in which events, which are not present-at-hand existing in the particular ‘now’, can have some semblance of existence. This, in Heideggerian terms, seems easy to discuss: although these future events, which belong to the future as world-time, do not exist as presence-at-hand, they certainly exist within the equipmental totality in relation to the using of equipment in the world-time present. In other words, as Dasein ‘now’ employs a hammer, the relation to the world-time futural event of ‘a fully-built house’ belongs to the “towards-which” of the current employment. The ‘towards-which’ that structures Dasein’s involvement in equipment is constitutive of the world-time future, and is involved in that totality of equipment insofar as it is continuously linked to the making-present of encountering of entities. It is on the basis of this (basic) understanding and mattering that Dasein employs the hammer. Blattner writes of the making-present use of equipment, “Simply insofar as we enpresent [make-present] the world-time now, we also expect [await] a world-time future, in which the task in which the equipment is involved will be completed...” (*Tp*: 320). This completion of the tasks constitutes an event, which, although it is not present-at-hand in the ‘now’, ‘exists’

to a certain degree insofar as it can be *expected* or *awaited* at all. This 'existence' is something that belongs to the relational totality of equipment, as it is along the line of the 'in-order-to' of employing the equipment.

Finally, I do not believe Heidegger's conception of these time structures falls to the critique given by McTaggart regarding the unreality of the time-series itself. If we recall McTaggart's argument, he states that one *cannot* grant the existence of the A-series without presupposing another time series in which the A-series exists. This was formulated in the following way: the A-series determinations are all given to an event. Thus, every event is past, present, and future, which is incompatible with the definitions of the determinations. The only way out of this is to say that the past exists before, the present, now, and the future in the future. In this way, one has presupposed a time series in order to make the first one intelligible. McTaggart writes:

It is never true, the answer will run, that [some event] *M* is present, past, and future. It *is* present, *will be* past, and *has been* future...These characteristics are only incompatible when they are simultaneous, and there is no contradiction to this in the fact that each terms has all of them successively. But this explanation involves a vicious circle. For it assumes the existence of time in order to account for the way in which moments are past, present and future. (*UR*: 468).

This critique of a vicious circle rests upon one of two notions: either that time only makes sense in a successive manner, or that the structure upon which the first series is based must be successive in order to make the first intelligible. As we have seen in Heidegger's temporality, neither of these are the case. Heidegger's temporality is formulated as such:

Temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a 'succession'. The future is *not later* having been, and having been is *not earlier* than the Present. Temporality temporalized itself in a future which makes present in the process of having been. (*SZ*: 350).

Temporality is a non-successive unity: it grounds the intelligibility world-time in such a way that does not require succession. Temporality, as the meaning of being of Dasein (or care) is bound into a whole. In other words, the primordial future *is* in the primordial past and present: it is only because Dasein is thrown into encountering entities that it takes a stand on its being through its '*for-the-sake-of-which*'. Similarly, the primordial past *is* in the primordial future and present: only insofar as Dasein must take a stand on its being through it '*for-the-sake-of-which*' in encountering entities can anything be factually given. Primordial time, or temporality, as we have seen, is a united whole. The succession, for Heidegger, enters only into the world-time, as it is a leveling of the primordial unity of temporality. The single unity of temporality is leveled once the present is no longer connected with the *primordial past* (facticity) and *primordial future* (primordial understanding), or in other words, when only the dealing with entities remains. In dealing with entities, however, the connection with the *world-time* past and future is not disconnected with the *world-time* present, as it is only insofar as the 'now' is spanned, or in other words, it is only insofar as entities matter and are understood that the world-time 'now' is possible. We see, therefore, that the continuity and successiveness of *world-time*, which is equivalent to McTaggart's A-series, is grounded upon temporality, which contains the structure of a non-successive unity. As such, we can conclude that temporality is that upon which we can base time in order to avoid McTaggart's charge of circularity.

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