

JUIS

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Letter from the Editor

Journal of Undergraduate International Studies

Dear reader,

I am pleased to present the Spring 2016 edition of the Journal of Undergraduate International Studies. This issue features articles on a diverse set of topics from a variety of disciplines, and we hope our readers will enjoy the unique perspectives that these articles present.

I am sad to say that this will be my last semester as editor-in-chief of the Journal, as I will be graduating. However, I am also happy to announce that three JUIS editors will be stepping up to run the Journal's operations. Laura Bunn, Alexa Grunwaldt, and Ainsley Nelson have proven themselves experienced and enthusiastic editors, and I am excited to hand the Journal over to them.

I am honored to have been a part of JUIS for the past four years, and am confident that the Journal will continue to publish insightful, eclectic, and innovative articles for years to come. As always, we hope that you enjoy reading!

-Grace Leppanen
Editor-In-Chief



Journal of Undergraduate International Studies

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The cover photograph was taken by Yasha Hoffman, from the University of Wisconsin-Madison

Observatory in the Ile Alatau, Big Almaty Lake, Kazakhstan. There are always new places to explore in the majestic Ile Alatau mountains directly south of Almaty. As I returned from a hike, clouds appeared almost out of nowhere and I captured this shot just before they showered us with a refreshing mountain rain.

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Worship and Success in Global Capitalism: *West African Pentecostal Immigrants in The Netherlands*

by Jacob Bessen

Religious institutions have become the archetypical example of rigidity that cannot adapt to globalization. According to Huntington's Clash of Civilizations thesis, cultural conflict, specifically culture assigned to the category of religion, will be "the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world."¹ This assertion is most helpful when trying to understand dominant misconceptions about religion in the age of globalization. Religion has reflected the changes in global economy leading to "processes of de-territorialization" that entail "a divorce or at least loosening of relationships between social organization and territoriality."²

Huntington's understanding of "religious conflict" (a popular catchall phrase with almost no stable meaning) occurring between two large, homogeneous geopolitical polities is dangerously archaic in a post-crusades era. Instead, religious conflict occurs regularly between religious groups in a single local society. Simultaneously, even large multinational religious organizations suffer from disintegration. Mosés Naím writes that, "Long-entrenched power of the major organized religions is decaying at a remarkably rapid pace."³ Now, the challenge for religious communities is to survive in a pluralistic society.


Religion is part of modern society. The belief that human teleology begins religious and ends secular has long been disproven.⁴ However, religious practices and thought must still follow globalization's mandate of adaptation. As Philip Jenkins writes, "Both Christianity and Islam face real difficulties in surviving within Europe's secular cultural ambience in anything

like their familiar historic forms. But instead of fading away, both have adapted to Eurosecularity and have continued to adapt."⁵ This development of religion is often presented as a way to affirm that Eurosecularism is a more just political ideology than its religious counterparts. The virtue of tolerance is made synonymous with hegemonic Western liberal culture and it is assumed that the "Other" cultures will follow.⁶ The shortcoming of interpreting religious adaptation as evidence of the superiority of Eurosecularism is that it separates a society's ability to maintain a civic ethos in the midst of cultural pluralism as separate from its set of productive relationships. Returning to Robertson's understanding of globalization, the changes leading to identities with increased global consciousness correspond to changes in economic compression.

The globalization of Christianity has shifted the loci of the religion's power. Often pointed to as the tool of European

colonialism, the Christians immigrating to former metropolises practice a different Christianity than Europe had exported. "Global Christianity," as Jenkins calls it, "challenges the prevalent view of Christianity as a white or Western ideology that was foisted on the rest of an unwilling globe, under the auspices of Spanish galleons, British redcoats, and American televangelists."⁷ Consequently, there are "quite deep tensions between the old and better-established churches, and those newer believers whose faith they view very coolly."⁸ The Churches of the global south that have risen on European shores are presented as foreign and unintelligible to Western sensibilities and the logics of rationality.⁹ However, the rise of Southern interpretations of Christianity is a dynamic arena to examine the changes and challenges prompted by globalization processes.

This paper examines Pentecostalism, the most popular and fastest growing Christian denomination



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in the global south, and illuminates the logics of capitalism deeply embedded within its theology. Based on a series of ethnographies with Nigerian and Ghanaian immigrants in the Netherlands, I ask how West African Pentecostal theology's understanding of economic relations and morality affect their integration into the host societies of the Netherlands. This inquiry regards three overlapping systems: religion, immigration, and capitalism. They are related through Marx's concept of historical materialism in which capitalist systems are the contemporary economic conditions of production and are abstracted to become "legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic...forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out."¹⁰ In other words, religion and immigration are experienceable versions of capitalism at a global level.

Pentecostal Christianity entails some of the logics and modalities of capitalism, resulting in capitalism commanding sacred authority. Meanwhile, adopting these mechanisms into the religious sphere has proven advantageous, allowing for cultural flexibility that helps believers comprehend the heterogeneous landscape of global society. I will argue that for Pentecostal Ghanaian and Nigerian immigrants in the Netherlands, their individual relationship with God allows them to perceive success in labor and social activities as a form of worship. As a result, they

feel encouraged to engage in critical adaptation as a means to increase the relevance and commonplace of their sacred successes in multicultural Dutch society.

First, I will examine my subjects' immigration experiences and the important role of imagination in this process. The way they interpret the society around them, the decision to leave their country of origin, and their choice of the Netherlands as their destination are imagined to reflect the ebbs and flows of capital in their societies. Next, I will examine how their relationship with God is based upon principles unique to capitalism. Lastly, I will show how this specific theological structure entails a circulation of worship and reward that accommodates and encourages critical adaptation.

Leaving Africa: The Apophysis of Wellbeing

The reason for migration cannot be dichotomized between "push" (reasons to leave) and "pull" (reasons to go) factors. In every interview, the respondent left because of a consciousness of what their home country could not provide and what their destination could. This consciousness is illustrated by the immigration of Afiba Osaloni.¹¹ Afiba is a musician from the Igbo states, the region damaged most deeply by the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970). He cites the civil war as the reason for his immigration to the Netherlands.

However, he immigrated 23 years after the civil war had officially ended. Afiba said:

We were having trouble with the Biafra war and the issue has not been addressed very carefully. It is still a problem that is raised indirectly. Personally I'm from Igbo states. If you look at the Igbos you can see the results of war. And the war resulted that we had not got the right as free citizens and we have not got the right to belong as a free citizen to one country... It is not like there is any purpose living in a country that leaves me without a purpose.¹²

Afiba left Nigeria not to flee from civil war, but to flee from the dramatic scarcity left from the war and perpetuated by a notoriously corrupt government's failure to develop the area. While other interviewees' interpretations of life in Africa are not as significantly contoured by a local event, these narratives are driven by a lack of opportunity and a consciousness of limitation that overwhelms any distinct sense of purpose.

Afe Adogame argues that consciousness of limitation arose out of economic strife in the mid-1980s West Africa. This strife resulted in the expulsion of 1.5 million illegal aliens between 1983 and 1985. Many of these displaced persons were Ghanaian and would constitute the first wave of West African immigrants to the Netherlands. Nigerian professionals were soon to follow. While at the beginning

"The limits placed on the prospective immigrant's freedom of movement raises their consciousness of their own global marginality. As a result, many turn to God to achieve the work traditionally assumed by the state."

of the 1980s, "few Nigerian professionals saw emigration as a rewarding option because their working conditions were attractive and internationally competitive," the deterioration of the state would start an exodus of skilled labor from Nigeria.¹³ This ongoing "Brain Drain" crisis is marked by two notable global processes that fundamentally determine the decision of skilled labor to leave: alienation from the state and orientation toward the economic core.

In an integral state, individuals invest their own human capital into a centralized network in order to share in a level of security or authority unattainable on their own. In the post-enlightenment era, the state has been regarded as the guarantor of equal rights in a community with members of different capabilities.¹⁴ The driving logic behind this form of human organization is "accumulation by dispossession," or the recognition that the state's power requires the individual to sacrifice their freedom.¹⁵ In cases where the state is sovereign, it holds a monopoly on the freedom of its citizens and the freedoms of citizens are only guaranteed through the state's tolerance for their existence.

In a corrupt state where the returns

of the invested freedom are low or distributed unequally, the citizen is estranged from their own humanity and freedom, and will choose to turn away from the state. As Hope Ibrinke noted, in the Nigeria she left, "friends and family can help you achieve anything you want to achieve."¹⁶ Historically, when the state recedes and citizenship loses its meaning, people will turn toward more exclusive levels of associational life, like family or tribe, to achieve their goals. In the age of globalization, it is increasingly possible for people like Hope to orient themselves towards a transnational community to fulfill the gaps left by membership in a failed nation-state.

However, acquiring the benefits of the transnational community takes time. The desire for immigration begins with alienation from the state, but the actual journey requires the negotiation of geopolitical bureaucracy. The limits placed on the prospective immigrant's freedom of movement raises their consciousness of their own global marginality. As a result, many turn to God to achieve the work traditionally assumed by the state. Nowhere is this clearer than the acquisition of the visa to enter

their new host country. Once a contract between persons as representatives of states, the visa is increasingly perceived as disencumbered from the state and as an item of social, material, and metaphysical significance.

Access to visas should be negotiated through public institutions. However, in Nigeria, control over these institutions is no longer produced through functional bureaucracy but through patrimonial systems. Accordingly, the visa procurement system has fallen into the domain of the free market producing a "plethora of migration counselors including immigration lawyers, advisers, agents, pastors, prophets, and diviners," along with illegitimate and illegal service providers.¹⁷

The ambiguities of authority between the state and the market give rise to God as a facilitator for personal opportunities. As a way to ensure their success attaining a visa, "prospective migrants and their families patronize sacred/religious sites, shrines, prayer camps, religious events where they undergo spiritual 'incubation' and 'inoculation' to fortify themselves against the machinations of witches, sorcerers, the evil eye, envious family relatives and friends."¹⁸ However, these practices are not limited practices for the single purpose of obtaining a visa. As Adogame writes:

The passage through the embassy on visa application and the interviewing stage is often

a nightmare; an insurmountable hurdle that can be surmounted only by the courageous, bold, aggressive, and sometimes canny ones. This explains why many successful applicants would render testimonies in church or mosques afterwards; undergo thanksgiving rituals...and organize parties to celebrate their success in obtaining a visa.¹⁹

Worship entices God to grant the features necessary for success in their endeavor. Simultaneously, capitalizing on the merits God has given is a necessary type of worship in itself. This merit is surrendered to God with the expectation of greater reward in future challenges. God facilitates the entirety of the challenging immigration process because God is the only one with the ability to do so.

The frustration with limitation and a sense of a lack of purpose are reflected in immigrants' geopolitical ambitions and ultimately determines their destination. Pastor Joan describes her limitations in Nigeria where she was a professor of educational studies at the University of Port Harcourt. Her eldest daughter needed to take a standardized test for admittance into the Nigerian college system. However, the entrance examinations were riddled with institutionalized cheating and bribery in which Pastor Joan refused to participate. She retells her family's struggle with corruption:

Just within that period of leaving her, they

started cheating, and because she didn't contribute money, they didn't allow her to finish. They took the exam and didn't let her finish. It was painful for me! And she didn't pass the exam. I just told them, let us pray that God will send us out of Nigeria. She would ask me, "when are we going?" I'd say, "in Gods own time." That's my testimony. And we kept praying and at Gods own time he brought us here. And my children, all five of them are in the US, they're not even here.²⁰

Pastor Joan believed that the solution to her daughter's problem was not in a neighboring country. Instead she thought that her daughter would be best suited in a place with the potential for increased status and capital. As an education specialist, she was conscious that better systems of education existed closer to the centers of capital. Pastor Joan did not want to leave Nigeria because of its characteristics as a nation-state, but because she wanted to belong to a community with better educational opportunities.

Geopolitical imaginaries no longer resemble seven continents dissected by black lines defining countries. Wallerstein argues that nation-states are no longer the primary unit of social analysis. Instead, transnational and regional zones should be regarded by their standing in the global division of labor.²¹ Pastor Joan wanted to move from a periphery region with low skill labor to a core region with high-skill labor and capital-intensive production. Core regions have

greater potential for increasing capital accumulation and transnational social status. Yet, it is not guaranteed; despite having a doctorate in education studies from a Nigerian university, Pastor Joan became a pastor after failing to find a job related to her degree. However, she is sure that immigration was God's plan because her children now live in the United States, the center of the global economy.

For the West African Pentecostal Christians that I spoke to in the Netherlands, immigration was the conclusion of a process of alienation from their country of origin. This process brought forth a critical sense of purposelessness and limitation. As a result, they assessed it was necessary to move from economic periphery to the core to alleviate the sense of social marginalization. In this process, believers felt that God facilitated their migration through the process of exchange. The perpetual exchange between God and the believer is a central practice in Pentecostal Christianity.

Charismatic Chrematistics and The Potentiality of Worship

In his masterwork *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Max Weber argues that the irrational system of capitalism did not arise out of a human desire for accumulation, but out of a puritanical form of asceticism that understood labor and accumulation as

sacred affirmation of their theodicy. The ascetic Puritans believed that successful accumulation of capital was holy validation of one's predestined entrance into heaven.²² Juxtaposed, West African Pentecostal theology prescribes a different relationship to God. However, Pentecostal beliefs emphasize the introduction of capitalist logics to both their behavior in the mundane community and their pleas to God.

Pentecostal Christians emphasize the importance of two behavioral practices: hard work and spreading the glory of God. Unlike Weber's Puritans, capital accumulation is not both the means and the ends of hard work. For Pentecostal Christians, believers must work hard, because if they are not constantly reinvesting their human capital, then they are in peril of being perceived as ungrateful and losing all they have worked for. As Gifford writes on Ghanaian Pentecostal interpretations of the workplace, "Everyone must add value to her gift. Even if you sew or sell stew, do it differently, better, so you can change more... 'Underdeveloped resources will be lost. The more you develop resources, the more you receive.' The rich get richer and the poor get poorer; this is the plight of Africa in a globalized world."²³

This specific understanding of labor as a "sink or swim" scenario reflects a global neoliberal capitalist economy. First, consciousness of the rapid effects of economic inequality are exacerbated

by rises in technological progress resulting in a skills premium and an ability to "hire and fire" that is unhindered by geographical restraints on labor costs.²⁴ This process has led to an economy where people are pushed to the extrema of success and failure. Even in Africa, the continent with the fastest growing middle class in the world, the social and psychological effects often associated with a stable middle-income group are not widespread.²⁵ For Pentecostal followers, the loss of a middle class leads to the abandonment of long-term, single-occupation labor as the religious ideal. Instead, religious community leaders encourage their parishes to work for comparably short-term successes.

Gifford's understanding of work in Pentecostalism contains a model that does not empower followers to pursue a steady middle-income job. Instead, it takes a neoliberal twist on Luther's concept of "the calling." Weber claims that the belief that God prescribed an occupation or lifelong task for each individual was a necessary development for the rise of capitalism.²⁶ In Pentecostalism, one is advised to aim for the position that delivers the most success. Pentecostalism does not have Lutheran theology's goal of retaining occupational identity. Instead, it focuses on an occupational opportunism that affirms the successes one finds and explains away their failures. This model resonates particularly well in a society full of tales like Pastor Joan's: even a

PhD cannot guarantee a steady job.

For Max Weber, the social job of religion was the resolution of theodicy: the explanation of each member's social situation in accordance with a just and benevolent God. For Pentecostal theologians, this task meant adapting their moral exegesis of labor to match the working conditions of the religious community. The Lutheran "Beruf" or "calling" is still socially omnipresent in the trans-religious expectation that adulthood is synonymous with the selection of an occupational identity. However, through the "deregulation" of the market, much of the working class lives without long-term occupational identities. Though social capital is, in part, prescribed through occupational categorization, this classification system is inaccessible to many. As Guy Standing elucidates, the neoliberalization of global economy has led to a significant amount of the proletariat losing their job security, resulting in their feeling chronically precarious. This new class, aptly named the "Precariat," "lack[s] a work-based identity. When employed they are in careerless jobs, without traditions of social memory, a feeling they belong to an occupational community steeped in stable practices, codes of ethics and norms of behavior, reciprocity and fraternity."²⁷ By removing the heterogeneity produced by diverse identity, members of the working class become more replaceable, and therefore more adjustable, in manifold unskilled

work positions.

The experience of precariousness is facilitated by this removal of a historical identity, alongside a pervasive loss of human agency. Standing writes:

A central aspect of globalisation can be summed up in one intimidating word, 'commodification.' This involves treating everything as a commodity, to be bought and sold, subject to market forces, with prices set by demand and supply, without effective 'agency' (a capacity to resist)...in a drive for market efficiency, barriers to commodification were dismantled. A neo-liberal principle was that regulations were required to prevent collective interests from acting as barriers to competition. The globalisation era was not one of de-regulation but of re-regulation, in which more regulations were introduced than in any comparable period in history. In the world's labor markets, most new regulations were directive, telling people what they could and could not do, and what they had to do to be the beneficiaries of state policy.^{28 29}

Re-regulation focused on a community member acting as an individual, as opposed to acting on a common interest. The working classes were compelled to adopt an increasingly

individualistic ontology of "the self." Simultaneously, they were also convinced to treat all things as having inherent value that could be exchanged. These things did not necessarily need to be physical items; perhaps the most important thing that can be exchanged under capitalism is one's labor, or even one's potential labor.

Pentecostalism adjusted to fit the new conditions prescribed for the religious sphere under the neoliberal capitalist material base. Fundamental to one's relationship with God is the exchange of holy action for reward. This exchange is both individualized and is an abstracted conception of capital accumulation. Historically, religion divides the onus for morality between the individual and the community. However, as Christian Socialist R. H. Tawney writes, the "rise of the spirit of modern business," resulted in "fostering a soulless individualism."³⁰ Tawney's assertion that capitalism engendered a more atomized society is reflected in neoliberalism's global commodification and labor schema.

The limitations imposed by the globalization of productive relations limits individual expression of identity. Sunday School teacher Thomas Anuli

said that immigrants should not search for acceptance in the Netherlands. He advocates for engagement through work, but when challenged with negotiating cultural difference, he said, "If you give me room to exist, I give you room to exist. You don't have to accept me."³¹ In Anuli's understanding of social cohesion, collective interests should not be established. Though Pentecostalism carries a strong evangelizing and missionary focus, it conceives of persons as individuals. It does emphasize bringing people into a community of God, but having them adopt Christian texts as their mediation between individual and God.

Central to Pentecostalism is the practice of a perpetual exchange with God. This process reflects the ontological understandings that power Marx's general formula for capital. Marx argues that in pre-capitalist periods, money arose as a way to mediate two commodities that existed in a different time or place.³² An artisan would produce their commodity and sell it to make money for the purpose of acquiring other things they would want or need. Exchanging a commodity for money for a different commodity (C-M-C) is

"Though Pentecostalism carries a strong evangelizing and missionary focus, it conceives of persons as individuals. It does emphasize bringing people into a community of God, but having them adopt Christian texts as their mediation between individual and God."

analogous to dominant conceptions of prayer. A believer prays to God for something and, by the means of God, they receive it. Both the believer and the prayer are things whose value, in the religious sphere, is measurable in terms of God. However, under the regime of capitalism, this form of exchange is illogical because the believer would accumulate without dispossession.

For Marx, the fundamental flaw of capitalism is that an investor purchases money with money by the means of commodity. While under the logic of C-M-C, both commodities are of equal value, in capitalist circulation, “M-C-M, however, proceeds from the extreme of money and returns to that same extreme. Its driving and motivating force, its determining purpose, is therefore exchange value.”³³ In other words, when an investor makes a purchase (the exchange of money for commodity) it is not for the value of the commodity at the place or time of purchase, but for the value they believe they will be able to make the sale for (the exchange of commodity for money). Over two-thousand years earlier, Aristotle criticized this same process under the name of chrematistics or “the art of acquiring property,” on the basis that it was contrary to nature.³⁴ With the circulation process of M-C-M, the identity or uniqueness of the commodity is irrelevant to the success of the exchange. For the persons involved, the only desirable feature from the commodity is its exchange-value, which

is a human construction that does not naturally belong to the commodity.

Pentecostal Christian conceptions of reward from God constitute a form of circulation that resembles M-C-M. The Pentecostal Christian gives a variety of things to God. For example, they could be, “making sure that God is loved,” or giving “my time, my body, my obedience, and my sacrifice,” “my total allegiance,” or “my energy, my resources.” From God they receive, “shelter from racism,” “entrance into university,” “a job,” or “love from their love.” However, God’s reward is also a form of worshiping God. As Gifford writes, “your success should be miraculous. More often than not, as we have seen, you take possession of your miracle by faith or by giving to God or to his representative.”³⁵⁻⁴⁰ The Pentecostal believer gives God worship in exchange for a second form of worship through the enactment of the miraculous reward. Therefore, the purpose of the first exchange (M-C) is to exchange worship, which has no value on its own, for the purpose of fleeting and formless grace of God. The second exchange, (C-M) transfigures grace into a form that returns, to the believer, a greater sense of worship. In a strictly ontological sense, worship and grace hold the same relationship that money and commodities do under capitalism. In both processes of circulation, the extreme of money or worship is circulated for the purpose of begetting more of the same extreme.

For the Pentecostal believer,

potential worship is omnipresent. As I was told by Pastor Joan, “In Matthew 6:33 it says ‘seek ye first God’s kingdom and his righteous and all these things will be added unto you.’ So I put God first in everything and I just see him work out the rest for me. Whether it is finance, whether it is my children passing their exams and being whatever God wants them to be in life. I give him my total. He’s number one in my life.”⁴¹ The act of “putting God first,” converts mundane activities or interactions into a form of worship. By putting God first, West African Pentecostal immigrants eliminate cultural and historical obligations that would prevent them from orienting towards the dominant core society and encourage a rigid cultural periphery at the fringe of the dominant society. They negotiate the new societies through their individual exchange with God, instead of through a separate historical memory or communal religious directions. With every activity having the potential to become a form of worship, Pentecostal immigrants are meritocratic and judicious when adapting to their new host country. Pentecostal theology removes many of the barriers of culture from pursuing equitable membership in a new society.

Critical Adaptation: A Survival Guide for Globalization

As Seyla Benhabib writes, the processes of globalization and international human migration have

resulted in “the disaggregation of citizenship.”⁴² Once belonging to a single domain, “residency, administrative subjugation, cultural identity, and democratic participation” have become decoupled and now can belong to multiple or none.⁴³ Human migration and this subsequent change have illuminated the dialectical contradiction “between sovereign self-determination claims, on the one hand, and adherence to universal human rights principles, on the other.”⁴⁴ In the future, specifically in the aftershock of the European migrant crisis, supranational protocol is likely to be developed to resolve this glaring lacuna in international human rights. In the meantime, the responsibility for disencumbering this contradiction is shared between immigrants and their host communities.

Often, the central tension in politics that receive global immigrants is between the historical geopolitical cultural identity and that of the newcomers. For both the historic and new community members, “in order to aim for maximum civic stakeholding, the apotheosis of citizenship, one would need to develop a fitting conceptual frame, one capable of identifying pivotal issues guiding effective tactics and strategies in real time.”⁴⁵ The necessary conceptual framework emphasizes neither cultural competition nor compromise, but exchange as the primary logic of multicultural cohesion. As Ahmed Samatar writes:

Critical adaptation as a strategy

for successful incorporation begins with reflexivity, or self-monitoring...The first part of becoming critically self-observant implies a skeptical evaluation of one’s own assumptions, codes of behavior, and expectations. Since every human culture is liable to have its own shortcomings, the key is to consciously protect the valuable and shed the liabilities. The second part of the task is to give the same treatment to new culture, as knowledge of its particulars grows.⁴⁶

As a concept, critical adaptation is the reassessment of which cultural values or practices hold value in new changing environments. No community is stagnant, and all cultural aspects must be reevaluated. For many of the immigrants I talked to, critical adaptation was enacted on the basis that success with more centrality and verisimilitude in multicultural Dutch society yields more valued forms of worship. It does not matter if successes belong to secular or religious domains. Those with greater recognition from the overall community have the most sacred worth

A common difficulty in incorporating immigrants moving from economic peripheries to cores is that they will experience racism and economic inequality. When this results in cultural entrenchment, it freezes the process of multicultural integration. Unfortunately, this is cyclical, because stopping the integration process increases racism and economic inequality, which in turn

increases cultural entrenchment. The teachings of Pastor Henry address this issue by asserting that a follower of God should not seek validation from society, but from their relationship with God:

They say, ‘at my school, at my workplace, I am being discriminated and they are not treating me the same way. What I deserve, they are sometimes denying to me.’ I keep on telling them, ‘no problem. The best come from God. So it shows in everything that we do it, we should do it whole-heartedly. The reward-God is going to reward us.’ So, inequality and especially as a migrant and living in a different country, there is nothing I can do. It will always be there, but that should not limit me from doing what God wants me to do.⁴⁷

The tension Pastor Henry is describing represents the limits placed on a newcomer by the natives and the Pentecostal tenet to find success as a way of worshiping God. Part of the correct worship of God is to fulfill his commandment regardless of the human environment.

In practice, this means accepting certain tenets of native culture and also retaining aspects of their own culture that offer an increased chance of success. The most common practices delineated by West African immigrants as being prerequisites for success in the Netherlands were the Dutch emphasis on punctuality and hard work. They also recognized that stricter discipline on children and teens and greater attention

toward their elders were cultural practices that would benefit them in the Netherlands.

The Pentecostal outlook overcame integration stagnation by choosing to deemphasize native xenophobia to attain greater success. Their focus on success carries danger because it could lead to native Dutch accepting them contingently upon their successes, as opposed to accepting them as integral human beings and community members. While these are very real liabilities, the interviewees were not concerned. As Afiba told me:

Who accepts you is not the land, it is God. He accepts you for keeping the rules and regulations. Then the judge will have no problem with you because they are open-handed to see that everybody is working. So that when you walk together, you move together. I need the Dutch and the Dutch need me. You're of good value to the land once you can bring effective change to the community. Everyone needs each other because we are all in the image of God.⁴⁸

Afiba recognizes that expanding the Dutch imagined community to include new, heterogeneous elements requires an increase in the intercultural interdependence of the material base. This assessment is congruent with Anthony Giddens' understanding of how consciousness of global interconnectedness as economic reality can become a social and identity-based

institution. Economic interdependence will progress and become a, "community of fate."⁴⁹ This rudimentary form of community will advance as intercultural and international familiarities begin to develop. As Giddens writes, the fundamental reason for someone to accept this community of fate is the recognition of, "globalisation as a new condition of life rather than some sort of external force to be succumbed to or defend against."⁵⁰

Conclusion: Globalization and Centrality

In this paper, I have argued that West African Pentecostal Christian immigrants in the Netherlands view success in the global capitalist economy as a form of worship. As a form of religious engagement, they practice critical adaptation to give their successes centrality in their contemporary Dutch environment. Critical adaptation is a framework for an individual to navigate historical differences and contrasting worldviews forced into juxtaposition by the processes of globalization. A great challenge of globalization is elevating critical adaptation from the individual stage to the global arena so that the tensions of heterogeneity can be solved at an inter-communal level. Can this framework become a central institution of global society?

Charles Taylor explores the global challenge of resolving the tensions of heterogeneity, deeming it the "politics

of recognition." Taylor analyzes Johann Herder's understanding of authenticity as a precursor to modern conceptions of identity. He writes, "being true to myself means being true to my own originality, which is something only I can articulate and discover. In articulating it, I am also defining myself. I am realizing a potentiality that is properly my own. This is the background understanding to the modern ideal of authenticity, and to the goals of self-fulfillment and self-realization in which the ideal is usually couched."⁵¹ As Taylor subsequently claims, this statement is true to cultural communities in a culturally heterodox society. However, he critiques Herder. While Herder understands the formation of identity as "inwardly generated," it is actually a dialogical process: both socially and inwardly derived.⁵²

Taylor's framework for the formation of identity maintains the assertion that imaginations of the social center reflect individuals in a society. As Edward Said argues, the particulars and character of the center of global society has historically been determined through power.⁵³ The center affirms the use of power by the hegemon by negating the potentialities of the "Other." Globalization illuminates that tensions in the relative differences of imagined centralities will become a critical dialectic in global communities. In the study of social networks, centrality measures the involvement of a node within a social structure.⁵⁴ Different imaginations of

what is central will be forced to conflict or adapt with the “intensification of the world as a whole.”⁵⁵

The limitation of originality and authentic identity has historically been a tool for discrimination. However as globalization progresses, bastions of homogeneity are disappearing. Meanwhile, the social derivations of identity help secure communal well-being. Not all versions of self-fulfillments should be encouraged or affirmed. In practice, no form of self-realization is perfect. The challenge of our time is to negotiate a social structure in which centrality is measured in an equitable, meritocratic, and inclusive manner.

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Comparative Analysis of Revolutionary Movements in Ireland and Russia:

How Regimes Integrate Former State Institutions

by Michael Bennett

There are abundant, striking similarities between the events occurring during the late 1910's and early 1920's in the nations of Ireland and Russia. Both countries experienced significant transformations in their governments through violent upheavals of the state. Furthermore, the adoption of new governmental bodies in each nation was followed immediately by bloody civil war. However, this essay will not solely focus on the revolutionary aspects of these countries' political changes, but also on what managed to remain during dramatic shifts in government. I argue that the Pro-Treaty forces in Ireland, along with the Red Army in Russia, were able to successfully defend their new governments from internal opposition because they were effectively able to absorb elements of the old regimes into their respective wartime state apparatus.

Irish Nationalists who defended the Anglo-Irish treaty received heavy support from their former colonizing power. The use of British artillery, aircraft, and arms gave the Pro-Treaty forces a decisive edge over the ill-equipped opposition. In Russia, Military Commissar Leon Trotsky brought in former Tsarist commanders to train his troops. In addition, the notorious Russian secret police, the Cheka, was modeled after the secret police department of the Russian Empire—the Okhrana. By analyzing how these governments managed to embrace, rather than reject, elements of their old regimes, it is also my aim to also shed light on the complex process of replacing long-standing authority within the state by applying a realpolitik perspective to historical events.

This comparative analysis will begin with overviews of the revolutionary

movements in Ireland and Russia at the start of the 20th century. Accordingly, appropriate attention will be given to explaining the significant role that certain institutions play during each nation's revolutionary conflict. Transitioning into the civil war phase of each country, I will elucidate how institutions present under one regime have been successfully integrated into the new governments. Following that, the essay will conclude with a general analysis of how the experiences of these nations inform us about the nature of regime change, utilizing such prominent ideas in political science theory as the relative deprivation model and the Barrington Moore Thesis regarding political development.

To understand the series of events which developed into the Irish War for Independence, it is necessary to explore the relationship between Ireland and

Great Britain, starting at the period of English colonial domination. In the 12th century, the Normans staged a successful of Ireland, bringing the territory under the direct control of the English for the next 700 years. The Plantation of Ulster was established by King James I to create a Protestant foothold in the northern region of the island, which was predominately Catholic during this time. Over time, the English colonizers utilized Irish industrialization to spur their own economic development.¹ Tensions between the native Irish and the English increased dramatically over the course of the 19th century as the Home Rule Movement gained momentum among Irish intellectuals and political thinkers. While there were still divisions among Irish leaders as to whether the nation would declare outright independence or simply push for internal autonomy,



Michael Bennett. Michael is a History and Political Science major at the University of Florida. The choice of countries to compare for this essay was simple; his father's side of the family comes from Ireland and his mother's side is from Russia.

the overall message was clear: English colonial rule in Ireland was no longer accepted.

1914 turned out to be a major turning point in the history of Irish independence. That year, the Home Rule Movement reached its pinnacle with the passage of the Government of Ireland Act by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. However, the Act was later postponed with the outbreak of World War I only months later.² After years of pushing for autonomy through legislative means resulted in no substantive gains for Irish self-governance, national leaders turned toward aggressive, revolutionary action in order to fulfill their goals. “Ireland unfree shall never be at peace,” proclaimed Irish political activist Patrick Pearse in 1915.³ One year later, the Irish revolutionary period commenced with the Easter Rising. As British troops were engaged overseas, Irish republicans staged armed insurrection across the island in order to physically assert their support for an Ireland free from British control. While the uprising was repressed by British troops stationed in Ireland, it sent a powerful message that the people of Ireland were willing to engage militarily in order to defend their fundamental right to self-determination.⁴

Though the Easter Rising was the essential inauguration to the Irish revolutionary period, the War of Independence officially began when Irish delegates to the British government from the Sinn Féin political party splintered

off to create their own parliament—Dáil Éireann. During their first meeting, the revolutionary Irish parliament declared, “We, the elected Representatives of the ancient Irish people in National Parliament assembled, do, in the name of the Irish nation, ratify the establishment of the Irish Republic.”⁵ No longer were the Irish citizens colonialists, but the legitimate proprietors of their own territory. With their declaration of independence, the British became enemy combatants unlawfully stationed in a land that no longer recognized their legal authority. That same day, members of the Irish Republican Army, acting without any orders, attacked and killed several British police officers. Physically and legally, war had broken out between the Irish and the British. Initially, the United Kingdom was hesitant to treat Irish aggression as anything other than an issue to be dealt with by the local police, but as the Irish Republican Army escalated its efforts to drive out the British, they more seriously engaged their revolutionary adversaries by declaring martial law and enlisting the Royal Irish Constabulary Special Reserve, more commonly known as the Black and Tans, to restore order. Under the command of military leader Michael Collins, the Irish forces were able to fend off the British Army to achieve a ceasefire after three years of fighting in July of 1921.⁶

Following the Irish War of Independence, the question became not whether separation from the United

Kingdom would be achieved, but to what degree. Immediately, total independence was no longer feasible as the northern counties of Ireland voted to remain part of the United Kingdom during the Partition of Ireland. For the southern region of the island still resisting English control, there was much debate over its future political destiny. After months of negotiation between the British and Irish governments, represented by wartime leader Michael Collins, a post-ceasefire treaty was agreed upon. The Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed on December 6th, 1921, signaled the end of formal aggressions between the nations, but precipitated another conflict. The Irish Free State, which was legally ratified as the legitimate government of the Republic of Ireland by Dáil Éireann, faced internal opposition by members of the party who believed the new administration failed to make significant gains toward securing total independence from the British. As part of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the Irish Free State was allowed to exist as a Dominion, giving it much more autonomy than before while remaining under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. Éamon de Valera, one of the parliamentary members who helped establish Dáil Éireann, openly opposed the Irish Free State and was instrumental in uniting other fellow Republicans to continue waging war to achieve a more favorable outcome than what the Anglo-Irish Treaty offered. Michael Collins, leader of the Pro-Treaty faction,

recognized that the Treaty failed to guarantee complete Irish independence, but saw it as a crucial first step to obtaining Ireland's unconditional right to self-determination at a later point.⁷ The Irish coalition which had achieved independence was now crumbling; those who had fought together against the British were now ideologically opposed in what would degenerate into Ireland's bloody civil war.

Similar to the Irish situation, events in Russia during the course of the early 20th century created destabilization within the country that deteriorated even worse due to the impact of World War I. Until 1904, Imperial Russia had maintained a position of traditional power in Europe as the last remaining autocratic government. That year, the Russian Empire experienced a humiliating military defeat at the hand of the newly emerging Japanese Imperial state. The Russo-Japanese War revealed Russia's inability to adjust its conservative policy—militarily and socially—to meet the challenges of a rapidly modernizing world. As a direct consequence of the Russo-Japanese War, unrest broke out in Russia that would last two years. "Discontent with the Tsar's dictatorship was manifested not only through the growth of political parties dedicated to the overthrow of the monarchy but also through industrial strikes for better wages and working conditions, protests and riots among peasants, university demonstrations, and the assassination

"The Irish coalition which had achieved independence was now crumbling; those who had fought together against the British were now ideologically opposed in what would degenerate into Ireland's bloody civil war."

of government officials" writes historian James DeFronzo.⁸ The upheaval of the Revolution of 1905 was finally quelled when Tsar Nicolas II issued constitutional reform that led to the establishment of the Russian State Duma and a new Constitution. These modifications to the structure of the Imperial government were implemented in order to satisfy the demands of the striking workers by providing a legislative assembly that would introduce greater civil liberties. While these reforms were able to placate the weary Russian citizens for the next decade, they proved to be fraudulent as the tsar still retained complete autocratic control over the state.⁹

Leading up to World War I, the condition of the Russian state was marred by an unresponsive aristocracy that failed to change the outmoded system of agriculture, improve education, or supplement the government with tools to improve civil participation. Order was maintained under these circumstances since the tsar still had the loyalty of the army and secret police who would quash any signs of civil unrest. This was to change when the outbreak of

World War I compelled Tsar Nicolas II to mobilize his troops to fight against the German state. In the tsar's absence, the political stability of Russia rapidly eroded due to food and labor shortages caused by the war effort. The weakening of the Russian state was compounded with military defeats on the battlefield which undermined the army's confidence of Tsar Nicolas II as a capable ruler. Such was the political environment that encouraged the growth of the Russian Revolution in 1917.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 was not a singular revolutionary episode, but a multi-part developmental process consisting of two distinct regime changes. The first revolution occurred in February when workers in Petrograd staged mass protests. The tsar left the battlefield with a battalion of troops to quash the uprising, but on the way to Petrograd, his train was stopped by mutinying troops. With the loss of his military backing, Tsar Nicolas II was forced to abdicate his throne, and with it, the last autocracy in Europe.¹⁰ In the wake of the February Revolution, a provisional government was set up.

"At the first engagement of the Irish Civil War, a bold precedent was established; the Republic of Ireland found itself a greater ally in the United Kingdom than the soldiers of the Irish Republican Army who had helped win its independence."

The Russian Provisional Government shared its power with local Soviets—leftist organizations who represented the lower classes. While this regime change was occurring, Russia still found itself locked in combat against Germany. The Provisional Government had a policy of continued aggression, while the Soviets, increasingly under the control of the Bolshevik political party, opted instead to end Russia's involvement in World War I. Over the next several months, a schism developed between the Provisional Government and the Soviets, who were absorbing workers into local militias referred to as the Red Guard. Finally, in the month of October, the Bolshevik party under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin staged a coup d'état against the Provisional Government to formally establish the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.¹¹

Similar to the Irish situation, the aftermath of Russia's revolutionary movement against a former regime ushered in a period of civil war. The ruling Bolshevik Party—the Reds—found itself competing against a host of rival political entities, referred to collectively as the

Whites. The White opposition consisted of a loosely organized coalition of anti-Bolshevik groups, including anti-communists, monarchists, and other socialists whose ideology clashed with the doctrine of Bolshevism. Moreover, the White movement in Russia received aid from foreign nations who wished to prevent the growth of international socialism.¹²

Having discussed revolutionary regime changes in Ireland and Russia and the origins of these nations' respective civil wars, this essay will shift its focus to discussing how the triumphant factions were able to effectively coopt elements of the rejected government in order to strengthen their wartime apparatus. Beginning with the Irish example, the Pro-Treaty bloc of the civil war successfully defended its new government from opposition by accepting British military support. With the ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, hostilities between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom were ended to the benefit of both parties. From that moment, the British Parliament recognized the governing authority of the Irish Free State

with its Dominion status. When the Anti-Treaty forces rebelled against the treaty, they were defying not only the legal Irish government, but also the government of the United Kingdom. Despite the fact that they had been engaged in war only months prior, the emergence of the Anti-Treaty faction obligated the Irish Free State and the British government to cooperate in order to preserve their budding reconciliation.

The dynamic of Irish and British collaboration is exemplified, most appropriately, by the first engagement of the Irish Civil War. Anti-Treaty republicans took over the Four Courts building in Dublin, hoping to spark unrest between Ireland and Britain once more. At this crucial juncture, The Irish National Army, led by former Irish Republican Leader Michael Collins, chose not to join the side of the republicans, but fight against them. Using artillery loaned to the Irish National Army by then Secretary of State for War Winston Churchill, the Pro-Treaty group bombarded the Four Courts.¹³ At the first engagement of the Irish Civil War, a bold precedent was established; the Republic of Ireland found itself a greater ally in the United Kingdom than the soldiers of the Irish Republican Army who had helped win its independence.

Throughout the course of the eleven-month war, the Pro-Treaty forces made extensive use of British military aid. In part, this arrangement was expedited by the fact that many British battalions had yet to leave the island

after the conclusion of the Irish War of Independence. When the civil war broke out, British troops stationed in Irish cities became repurposed to help fight alongside Britain's reluctant ally. Of particular benefit to the Pro-Treaty cause was the employment of Britain's extensive Navy. "The Royal Navy, beyond its expected role of gun-running prevention, did have an influence on the early course of the Civil War, an influence that was, in part, determined by the wider protection of imperial interests once British troops had withdrawn from the localities in May 1922" notes historian John Linge.¹⁴ Information gathered by British secret intelligence on Ireland when it was a unified threat to the United Kingdom during the War for Independence was later exploited by the Pro-Treaty faction once its objectives aligned with those of Britain.¹⁵ Though British support was a significant factor in the eventual victory of the Pro-Treaty wing, Irish National Army leaders had to perform a careful balancing act. In order for the Irish Free State to justify its existence, British assistance could not be allowed to overwhelm what ultimately had to be the Irish Republic's fight to protect its legitimacy.

In the same way the Irish employed the aid of their former administrators—the British—so, too, did the Russian revolutionaries call upon assistance from their antecedent regime. During the initial stages of the Russian Civil War, the Bolshevik army was comprised

mainly of local militias created by the Soviet organizations. Realizing that these untrained peasant soldiers would not be enough, War Commissar Leon Trotsky conceived the Red Army by issuing mandatory conscription. Despite having larger numbers, the Red Army was still largely undisciplined and unable to win on the battlefield. To rectify this problem, Trotsky enlisted the service of former Tsarist military commanders, referred to as *voenspetsy*. Often, their loyalty to the Red Army was ensured due to threats against their families if they refused. Trotsky's strategy of taking advantage of the former regime's military command paid off; the Red Army was beginning to repel the forces of the Whites. "By the end of the civil war, one-third of all Red Army officers were ex-Tsarist *voenspetsy*," notes historian R. J. Overy.¹⁶

Another successful example of cooption implemented by the Russian SFSR was the adoption of a secret police body known as the Cheka. Secret police organizations already had an established history in Russia. The Okhrana was the police service active during the reign of the Russian Empire. With the regime change from monarchy to a radical, socialist government, the application of a secret police was not discarded by those now in power. Historian Amanda Ward argues, "Of all the revolutionary organizations the Okhrana pursued, the Bolsheviks were perhaps the most familiar with the

operations of the Tsarist secret police. Most in the party's leadership had, in one form or another, interacted with the Okhrana prior to the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in 1917."¹⁷ From the Okhrana, the Cheka gained valuable insights in how to effectively organize a clandestine police department. Many of the tactics and strategies used by the Okhrana were transferred over to the Cheka. During the Russian Civil War, the Cheka was used extensively in order to guarantee the loyalty of soldiers and Russian citizens. If the secret police discovered a soldier was planning to maroon, that individual was quickly executed to serve as a reminder to other combatants of the punishment that awaited them should they neglect their duty to their government. After the war, the Cheka was dissolved, but its blood-stained legacy continued to influence later iterations of Russian secret police.

The final segment of this essay will apply theories of political science to the historical models discussed in the previous sections. Since the Irish and Russian Civil Wars were both products of revolutionary movements, it is necessary to first discuss the nature of revolution through the lens of political theory. Influential political sociologist Barrington Moore, Jr. has written much about the role of revolution in society. In his famous work, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Moore writes that a "revolutionary break with the past" is one of the prerequisites for

creating a modern society.¹⁸ Moore would argue that it was necessary for Ireland and Russia to shed their respective colonial and autocratic pasts in order to develop into modern nations, though with admittedly different paths.

If revolution was necessary, how did it occur? One answer for this comes from the work of political scientist Ted Robert Gurr and his relative deprivation thesis. His argument outlines that revolutions happen when societies experienced discontent with their current situation relative to what they've experienced in the past.¹⁹ For Ireland, the Home Rule movement had promised self-determination for decades. When World War I eliminated the prospect of legislative change, the only perceived option remaining was violent revolution. Similarly, Russia at the beginning of the 20th century was the last bastion of autocratic rule in Europe. With nations all across Europe transforming their governments, intellectuals and members of the public alike realized that conditions in Russia were no longer sustainable under the Imperial form of government. The theory of relative deprivation can further be applied to Ireland and Russia since both countries experienced unsuccessful revolts before ultimately encountering revolutionary movements that brought about great change. The failures of the Easter Rising in Ireland and the Revolution of 1905 in Russia signaled that society at large was turning away from the regime and that insurrection was all but inevitable.

During all of this upheaval, it is

"It is remarkable that the governments of the Irish Free State and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic were able to incorporate useful components of the regimes they helped to dismantle in order to fight their ensuing civil wars... During times of struggle, both Ireland and Russia rejected their ideological positions in order to provide for the real needs of their fledgling governments."

remarkable that the governments of the Irish Free State and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic were able to incorporate useful components of the regimes they helped to dismantle in order to fight their ensuing civil wars. The Bolsheviks, for example, used rhetoric to situate themselves as idiotically separate from the autocracy as possible, but they still had to rely on former Imperial features to safeguard their new government. Ultimately, the perspectives offered in this essay fall under the realpolitik school of thinking within the realm of political science. During times of struggle, both Ireland and Russia rejected their ideological positions in order to provide for the real needs of their fledgling governments. It is important for political scientists to understand the policy limitations of ideology, especially during periods of civil war. This essay has shown how governments born out of opposition to a former regime can be willing to accommodate certain facets of their previous leadership if it's in the best interest of that nation.

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Countering the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria:

Why the West Has it Wrong

by Amanda Borquaye

Baqiya wa tatamadad, “lasting and expanding”, is a bold declaration.¹ This is the motto of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), an organization that has effectively evoked fear in several corners of the globe. ISIS epitomizes the United States Department of Defense’s definition of terrorism due to their status as a sub-national group that carries out premeditated and politically motivated violence, perpetrated against noncombatant targets. The media has proliferated images and videos of the group’s indiscriminate use of violence against civilians as they seek to garner more attention and accumulate power. By sifting through the various recruitment tactics, branding, and marketing methods that ISIS utilizes in order to capture the attention of vulnerable and impressionable individuals across the world, one can assess the growing threat that this organized crime group and terrorist organization poses as it permeates the minds of policy makers and undermines international security and sovereignty.

In order to understand how the seemingly incompatible jihad is appealing to Westerners, one must have a clear sense of what jihadism entails. According to Michael Bonner, Westerners have an incorrect notion of the meaning of jihad. He asserts that jihad does not mean “holy war” or “just war”, a commonly held idea in the West. Rather, jihad means, “striving”. As a concept, it is fighting on behalf of God or for the sake of God.² The question that must remain in the minds of our leaders is how a word that has traditionally evoked fear and conjured images of terroristic acts of violence is now shedding its tarnished view and instigating appeal, convincing Westerners to leave their lives behind in order to embody it. This paper aims to examine how jihad, commonly perceived and regarded as a rejection of contemporary

Western culture and the values that it promotes, is becoming progressively more accessible to individuals in Western nations. Furthermore, this paper seeks to address the implications of a Westerner joining ISIS.

Threat Inflation in the West

The Western world is fearful of ISIS for imprecise and incorrect reasons. The notion that the Islamic State (IS) presents imminent danger to ordinary citizens is somewhat true; however, our foreign policy is not reflective of the fact that we should fear ISIS not because of, as former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel claimed, “threats...just as real and deadly as anything we’ve ever dealt with”, but rather because they have the capacity and ability to radicalize individuals living in Western countries.³ Secretary Hagel

played an instrumental role in conjuring fear in the United States for reasons that do not wholly pertain to domestic security, which is indicated by statements such as “the Islamic State is an imminent threat to every interest we have, whether it’s in Iraq or anywhere else...”⁴ This threat inflation, the deliberate exaggeration of what the United States is dealing with in order to arouse fear from the public, detracts from investigating the true threats that ISIS poses to American people. Furthermore, government officials are often guilty of blatant fabrication, formulating a threat that in actuality does not exist. Numerous U.S. intelligence officials have stated, “We have no credible information that [the Islamic State] is planning to attack the homeland of the United States”.⁵ Instead of inciting fear among the public with false claims that an attack on U.S.



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soil conducted by ISIS is imminent, intelligence officials and politicians should work to prevent individuals in Western nations from becoming radicalized jihadists. This threat inflation is merely a distraction from the true threat that the Islamic State poses and prevents effective and preemptive policies from being drafted.

A Look at Recruitment Tactics

The Islamic State urges fighters to establish and secure a caliphate, "a unified Muslim state run according to a strict interpretation of Islamic law".⁶ To radical jihadists, violence is the only way to restore the caliphate. As I have previously stated in this paper, ISIS is able to attract Westerners; however, they perceive themselves as natural enemies of the West and all that its culture glorifies and symbolizes. ISIS' propaganda has called for few attacks on the West, yet few Americans will be able to forget the video showing the beheading of James Foley, an American journalist.⁷ The terrorist organization even claimed that if the United States chose to attack, it would "result in the bloodshed of Americans".⁸ Unlike al-Qaeda, ISIS is intentional about not threatening attacks on the West with frequency.⁹ Perhaps

what U.S. intelligence officials should emphasize are the overlaps between ISIS' ideology and what a vulnerable individual living in the West may feel is missing from their lives. One must question why someone living in the West would find himself or herself aligning with a mission to "righting an ancient wrong...creating a unified Muslim state that will subsume existing nations".¹⁰ ISIS is particular about framing its position as a victim, deprived of the opportunity to unite Muslims because of the ways in which the West drew national borders in the Middle East after World War I. This arbitrary drawing of borders has had visible impacts on ethnic and religious relations in the region. How are Westerners resonating with this sense of victimhood being that the lands they live in were the perpetrators?

The media repertoire of ISIS is noteworthy. The propaganda videos differ from country to country, suggesting that ISIS is mindful of its audiences and how it can present itself in an appealing manner. They produce an English-language magazine, *Inspire*, effectively summarizing how they hope to capture the attention of Westerners. Their major speeches have been posted online in seven languages, and their videos feature a glorified version of violence not too far removed from what we are used to seeing in Hollywood. They

are present in a variety of social media platforms, not limited to SoundCloud, Instagram, and WhatsApp.¹¹ The United States is aware of ISIS' prolific social media presence and the magnitude of its effectiveness. Attempting to use social media as a means to counter ISIS recruitment, the Department of State has several campaigns such as "#ThinkAgainTurnAway", which is present on Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.¹² Pamphlets specifying recruitment tactics and methods are disseminated throughout ISIS. Members are encouraged to spend as much time as possible with their potential recruits, sharing their hopes and future plans with one another and talking about their joys and sorrows together.

In seeking to counter terrorism and defeat ISIS, policymakers of the West must begin to tackle the digital realm, for most foreign recruits become radicalized and make their first connections with ISIS and its jihadi principles from social media platforms. Additionally, local populations are more likely to support ISIS because of its social media propaganda that is intended to instigate fear and squash opposition. It has proven to be rather difficult for the United States to weaken the Islamic State on this front due to

their clever structural setup, a setup that takes a tremendous amount of effort and strategy to dismantle. There is a leadership in place responsible for setting ideologies and values. Then, there is a sect below the leaders who are responsible for implementing said ideology. Following these two powerful layers are the fighters, recruiters, wives, and everything in between. The corporation-like structure means that those in charge of ISIS' marketing and propaganda materials have Twitter accounts with strong privacy settings and few followers, making it hard to pinpoint who to confront. "Digital fighters", the ones disseminating the problematic ideology of the Islamic State online, often maintain several backup accounts in case they get flagged for violating the terms and conditions.¹³

Diminishing the power and presence of the Islamic State online would be instrumental in the fight against ISIS, yet, to date, there has been little strategy provided to counter terrorism via this avenue. I suggest that Western nations form a coalition with these various social media sites and platforms with the sole purpose of monitoring extremist propaganda for intelligence purposes. Operating as a task force, these coalitions would be able to rid the internet of extremist propaganda by targeting the "bot" accounts, ones that are not operated by actual humans that generate several messages and images a day. However, the most effective means to eliminate online propaganda would be to

eliminate those who proliferate it online. Western governments should emphasize that any one who is found to interact with these accounts will be thoroughly investigated and perhaps detained if necessary. Lastly, the West should consider setting up undercover accounts that only appear to be recruits but are in actuality being operated by intelligence officials. This will be beneficial in that it will allow governments to be aware of specific accounts and individuals to target, but it will also provide insight into the process of radicalization via online recruitment methods, which can lend itself to new ideas on how to combat this phenomenon.

Perhaps most importantly, recruiters are told not to mention jihad but rather to begin with regularly discussing the basics of Islam.¹⁴ A former ISIS recruiter who now serves as a Canadian intelligence agent states that, "We look for people who are isolated and if they are not isolated already, then we isolate them", which means that young people, often struggling to find a sense of self or seeking fulfillment are often prey.¹⁵ From a sociological standpoint, people who are estranged and alienated from their own societies become sympathetic to any opposing political system.¹⁶ The disconnect that Westerners experience in their own countries causes them to idealize the Islamic State, which is itself often framed as a stride towards unity. ISIS not only seeks to radicalize Muslims living in the West, but rather, they especially hope to

convert Christians, claiming, "Islam is the correction of Christianity".¹⁷ Recruits who were not originally of Islamic faith are often more radicalized than their counterparts, making them especially volatile when they return home, eager to demonstrate how the West inhibits the spread of Islam via vicious and devastating attacks in several cities. This is why particular attention should be paid to those who do not seem like they would align with ISIS rather than relying on stereotypes and racial profiling in order to prevent the spread of ISIS.

However, for Muslims, ISIS essentially guilts them into fighting, framing jihad as more than just a way to achieve personal fulfillment in faith, but as a duty for all Muslims. Stronger than national ties is the unifying tie of their Islamic faith, which is so strong that it should cause individuals to reject their state status and travel to Syria instead. As one recruitment video states, "the caliphate is about victory and dignity of Muslims".¹⁸ Once framed this way, it makes the prospect of fighting honorable and noble, something which one should feel a sense of obligation. There is a psychological component in which desire overrides reason and rational individuals begin to believe in the façade of ISIS, its constructed image of a place filled with people who idealize honorable values and reject the less desirable and nontraditional Western values. For all of these reasons, it is evident that ISIS is not only engaged in physical warfare but also colonizing the impressionable, vulnerable,

and malleable minds of Westerners, reflecting that this organization is highly skilled in psychological warfare as well.

Appeal and Motivating Factors: Reasons to Join ISIS

The discourse around threat inflation and ISIS is not meant to undermine the prowess of this terrorist organization. It has been recognized as both the wealthiest terrorist organization in the world as well as a “formidable militant organization”.¹⁹ In several regards, it has begun to rival al-Qaeda with its immense wealth (achieved through illicit practices), its professionalized information operations, and its commitment to spreading jihadism by seeking global recruits. ISIS is frightening for reasons beyond their military capabilities and brutal practices. Their high-quality video productions, urging individuals to join them in the fight for jihad, and their active Twitter messages are equally terrifying. ISIS’ control on modern means of communication adds an element of fear. Aside from intimidating its perceived enemies, ISIS capitalizes on the reality of living in a world dominated by media and the ease of its access and impact, meaning any individual around the world is now vulnerable to becoming radicalized.

There are some inviting aspects of ISIS that aid in luring in foreign fighters. Their sheer wealth and power alone are enough to attract people who feel that there are few opportunities for self-fulfillment and economic growth. By 2010, ISIS was supplying salaries larger than what the local government in Iraq was

offering, adding an incentive to join the fight.²¹ ISIS’ immense wealth does not solely function as a motivating factor to join, but it is also particularly troubling because despite being restricted from worldwide trade and managing drone strikes, they maintain their wealth and power. By offering better opportunities than what are currently available, ISIS presents itself as a welcoming network, one in which an individual can become a part of a support system and rise the ranks. Dismantling their source of income would prove useful to Western nations and would curtail the jihadi influence in Iraq and Syria as well as in the Western countries from which they continue to recruit. The United States must be stern on its allies and ensure that they do not contribute to the economic growth of ISIS. Sanctions should be imposed on allies of the United States such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar who were pivotal in funding ISIS in its early stages, effectively birthing one of the biggest threats to international security. The financiers are primarily motivated to fund ISIS and other militias because the American opposition is too moderate and does not have much support, namely a lack of arms, from the West.²² The United States treasury is aware of the illicit money laundering and illegitimate money flows, yet they have stalled on taking action. Our allies, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar have attempted to pass legislation that makes the flow of money difficult; however, there are private donors

that continue to blatantly evade the system and operate outside of traditional channels, receiving no punishment.²³

The International Center for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR) has found that approximately 1,000 foreigners are joining ISIS every month.²⁴ ICSR’s studies reveal that there is an element of appeal due to the fact that joining ISIS and carrying out violence is regarded as important, garnering worldwide attention from global leaders. By offering the alienated and isolated a chance to feel important, particularly youth who are desperate for finding meaning in their lives, the idea of abandoning one’s home country and dedicating their life to ISIS is alluring and welcoming.

The recruitment approach is gendered in order to cater to ISIS’ mission to fulfill idealized gender roles. Married men are encouraged to bring their families instead of leaving them behind, and single men are provided with wives so that they may create families. Men are reserved to roles in which their masculinity can shine: fighter, provider, protector, father, and husband. There is an element of lust that accompanies ISIS propaganda, for men are enticed by the idea of martyrdom. Women are placed into roles in which their femininity is highlighted such as mother, wife, caretaker, and vulnerable beings in need of their husband’s protection. Recruits are falsely told that they will be a part of a new society, a utopia of sorts, in which they will face no discrimination or maltreatment as they dedicate their

lives to becoming “true” men and women. Denigration of Western culture is essential to ISIS’ gendered recruitment tactics. They assert that the Western lifestyle restricts traditional gender roles from being realized. ISIS ideology maintains that femininity is a fundamental proponent of masculinity; therefore, one must exist in order for the other to exist.²⁵ By indicting Western culture and values, ISIS makes it easier for fighters from the West to reject their respective societies.

Since leaders are concerned with mitigating and deterring security threats, they should emphasize their efforts on female recruits. Male recruits are enticed by the idea of martyrdom and are at the forefront of attacks; therefore, they are less likely to return back to their Western nations with the intention of carrying out an attack. Contrarily, women are more likely to return home and attempt to carry out an attack. This is why particular scrutiny should be placed upon stopping the recruit of female fighters.

With regards to female recruits, it is imperative that Western policy makers are cognizant of the ways in which Muslims in their countries are treated in everyday society. The lack of urgency in addressing the needs of Muslim populations, who are minorities, in Western nations is a motivating factor for these Muslims to leave these countries and join ISIS, who depicts the West as the antithesis to Islam and a perpetrator of oppression. Often feeling a sense of alienation and isolation, especially women due to their

religious attire, Muslims resort to joining ISIS with the belief that they will live free of the oppression that characterizes their lives in the West. Women are more likely to be the victims of Islamophobic attacks due to the stigmatization of traditional Muslim religious attire such as the burqa, a controversial piece of clothing in many Western nations. France, a nation from which ISIS has recruited with frequency, had a ban against women wearing burqas. In these instances, followers of Islam feel that their religion is under attack, and beyond that, that Western values are fundamentally incapable of accepting their religions. This incompatibility leads to seeking an alternative lifestyle, which is what ISIS offers under the façade of being an Islamic utopia.

When passing legislation that alienates Muslim members of society, it is necessary for leaders to consider how these laws will impact the perception of the state and how it will cause individuals to question the government’s motives. The ISIS anti-West sentiments and narratives become ever more resonant as individuals feel that they are being victimized by the Western government systems. In order to combat this, leaders should aim to accommodate their Muslim minority populations and spearhead the change in destigmatizing Muslim attire rather than being at the forefront of such stigmatization that becomes socially widespread and embedded into culture.

Considerations for Countering ISIS

The credibility and reputation of the Obama administration is also a key factor in countering the growing influence of ISIS. When other nations believe that the administration has lacked credibility, it leads to a tarnished image that influences actions and impacts decisions. Governments of the Gulf-area countries feel justified in allowing their citizens to fund the extremist groups in Syria because of Obama’s failure to follow through with a strike on President Assad after his regime began to use chemical weapons.²⁶ This event led to a loss in trust and a sense of desperation and urgency. The United States’ inability to act caused citizens of the area to take matters into their own hands, as they had accepted that the United States and other Western nations were not going to intervene on their behalf. Because the extremist groups have the most wealth and resources, the opposition militias are left with few options, not receiving much support, supplies, and resources from the West. The West should seek to follow through with promises and be intentional when it chooses to intervene internationally, displaying a commitment to global security and peace building rather than inserting itself as a global hegemon.

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Conclusion

The fight against the Islamic State needs a narrative change. In the United States, it is apparent that the common consensus is that ISIS must be either

contained or defeated. This framing is misguided; there is no containment of ISIS. It is on a trajectory of immense growth and wealth that will continue to allow it to bully local populations in a self-righteous, fabricated, fictitious pursuit to establish a caliphate. There must be a sense of awareness that the Westerners' fear of an imminent attack, is experienced by Syrians daily, alongside actual violence, terror, and destruction. The average American who fears that ISIS may attack on the homeland should focus their attention to how ISIS has been able to capitalize on the cultural weaknesses of America and other Western nations, who harbor unchecked and implicit, or sometimes explicit, biases against their Muslim peers. We should recognize how these biases are generating a sense of resentment and disdain for the Western world, endangering Western nations of becoming the objects of jihadi extremism's violence.

The field of International Relations tends to leave little room for approaching policy from a cultural perspective, a mistake of underestimating its significance

in solving conflict. In the case of ISIS, it is imperative that we seek to dismantle the cultural biases that become ingrained as cultural norms. We must question how the West is perceived as so hostile and alienating that an individual would be willing to leave and dedicate their life to an organization as violent and problematic as ISIS. There must be recognition that radicalized individuals may return for the sole purpose of exacting revenge.

While most of the violence is occurring in the Middle East, the West must not be complacent; the existence of ISIS is a threat to security and a mockery of sovereignty. It is relevant to Westerners' everyday lives as we see nations hesitant to accept Syrian refugees, deeming them a security threat. Leaders are failing to realize that they share a commonality with these refugees: both are trying to escape the brutality of the Islamic State. Ultimately, we must limit militarism and allow for a multilateral approach to defeating ISIS. No amount of drone strikes will be able to contain or defeat an organization that has captured thousands of miles in territory and brings in millions of dollars in revenue on a daily basis. The indiscriminate use of drones has been more effective at decimating the civilian population than it has been in hindering the Islamic State. Rather, the only purpose repeated drone strikes serves is to assert the United States' international hegemony, exaggerating the notion of toughness all while being low-cost to the United States and causing no

U.S. casualties. To be solely militaristic is to be neglectful of the ways in which the Islamic State has managed to extend its reach globally. A drone strike does not address the alienated youth who spend hours online chatting with ISIS recruiters. And a drone strike does not address the complexities of gender, Islam, and Western values. Opposition militias cannot be expected to defeat ISIS when their backers offer little to no support. Ultimately, the West needs a fundamental perspective change on how to mitigate one of the most troublesome threats of the 2010s, and the leaders of these nations must assess where they can contain ISIS' influence.

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National Discrimination and Transnational Democracy:

The Cosmopolitan Role of the European Union and the International Romani Union in the Protection of the Roma

by Katherine Koza

Many European nation-states and the European Union have historically struggled, and continue to struggle, to interact well with the Roma. Members of this historically nomadic group that does not possess a state of its own have often been forced to rely on the goodwill of the states in which they reside in order to receive equal rights. They have done so with limited results. However, the rise of international cosmopolitan human rights law and transnational governing bodies such as the European Union may provide greater protection to the Roma people—that is, if states with Roma populations cooperate.

In this paper, I describe ways in which current and historical clashes between territorial nation-states (and their citizens) and the marginalized Roma people raise cosmopolitan problems even in an era of human rights law. I first discuss how legislation crafted by the European Union for the protection of the Roma may contradict the discriminatory wishes of some of the democratic states that constitute it, or perhaps even the wishes of the Roma, themselves. I examine the question: how could the forms of political cosmopolitanism practiced by the European Union and its members better serve the non-territorially bounded and historically marginalized Roma, and how could international legal norms for the protection of non-territorial groups avoid steeping its member nations in what Seyla Benhabib calls “the paradox of democratic legitimacy?”¹ My proposed answer involves greater Romani participation in international negotiation,

a transnational view of democracy, and a continued willingness on the part of the European Union to embody forms of representational democracy that would allow its member states to non-paradoxically endorse its laws. In short, I argue that the European Union must strive not only to be a legitimate democratic iteration that upholds the ideals of moral cosmopolitanism often found in human rights law, but also to be a multicultural and cosmopolitan institution that works in inclusive and multileveled ways with national entities and with groups such as the International Romani Union (IRU).

Cosmopolitanism, Human Rights, and the Westphalian State

To understand why the relationships between the Roma, the European Union, and its member states raise cosmopolitan problems, we must first understand what “cosmopolitan” means in this context. The

use of the term, “cosmopolitanism,” is often associated with modern and postmodern writers, but it actually has ancient roots. According to Gerard Delanty, “The word cosmopolitan is itself of course Greek, kosmopolites, meaning citizen of the world, and is generally first attributable to Diogenes the Cynic (c. 412–323).”² The term has been defined in many ways over time, but I define it here as a form of politics that centers around that which is human and allegedly universal over that which is national, territorial, and sectarian, without necessarily abandoning national, territorial, or sectarian structures altogether. By transcending state structures to a certain degree, cosmopolitan politics allows rights to accrue to humans as humans, not merely as citizens of a state. Thus, cosmopolitan politics can be conceptualized as foundational to human rights discourse, and it can be a helpful tool for individuals and groups who have been underserved by the states in which they reside.



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Cosmopolitan ideas about politics and morality have shaped social and political structures over time. For example, cosmopolitan perspectives were apparent in the early Christian church in its emphasis on a kingdom beyond the national kingdom to which all human beings would belong.³ Additionally, until relatively recently, political organization was not centered on the nation-state but rather was formulated in ways that could be described as cosmopolitan. According to Kal Raustiala:

Many older systems of rule were not territorial at all. The sovereign territorial state is essentially a European invention, but even in Europe it is only a few centuries old. Medieval Europe lacked sovereign, territorial states as we know them today. The medieval order instead comprised multiple, layered centers of political power as well as diverse sources of legitimation, allegiance, and identity. Both secular and ecclesiastical forms of rule were important, and clearly demarcated borders that divided the various medieval rulers from one another did not exist.⁴

This cosmopolitan history provides us with a measure of hope that political formations that question the practices or the dominance of the Westphalian nation-state could become more prevalent: as I will argue, an emphasis on complex and multileveled forms of government could benefit the Roma. Speaking more generally, in an era whose issues—including climate change, terrorism, drug trafficking, and internet regulation—are highly transnational, and

in a post-World War II era in which people prosecute international crimes against humanity, new and less territorial models of governance may continue to be needed alongside traditional territorial models to serve millennial political reality. I suspect that the nation-state will continue to be a fundamental concept in world politics: as Raustiala writes, “[A]s a political reality, territorial governance remains robust and is remarkably total. Virtually every patch of ground on Earth save Antarctica is allocated to some sovereign state.”⁵ However, the nation-state may need to rethink its roles, its notions of democratic legitimacy, and its notions of national self-determination, given the rise of international organizations and pressing ethnic and cultural issues that transcend national borders.

Such new cosmopolitan political ideas and formations are currently at play, according to scholars such as Benhabib, who argues that Kantian cosmopolitanism regained popularity after World War II and continues to shape international human rights discourse today.⁶ In *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Immanuel Kant advocates for the moral worth of all humans based on their ability to reason.⁷ This moral philosophy is cosmopolitan in scope in that it prioritizes what is human and allegedly universal over what is national and sectarian: it does not say to only respect your fellow national citizens as ends in themselves, but rather to respect all rational beings as such regardless of their place of origin. In “Perpetual Peace,” Kant also argues in favor of a federation of free states—what

he referred to as a “pacific federation”—to ensure the freedom of each state and to lead to a perpetual peace on Earth.⁸ This proposed federation parallels, in some respects, institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union. According to Benhabib, such cosmopolitan ideas and suggestions for political organization took hold after the Second World War as a response to the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime.⁹ Seeking a way to prosecute activities that were obviously criminal by international moral standards but were entirely legal under Nazi law, a new, Kant-inspired wave of international law occurred, creating, among other things, the United Nations International Declaration of Human Rights.¹⁰

Judging the merit of positive laws by an abstract concept of universal moral laws may make some squeamish about the metaphysical or theological overtones to such actions, and it may make others concerned that the practice of human rights law will simply boil down to Western moral norms being wrongly universalized. While I resonate with those criticisms, I also think that, especially after the genocide committed during World War II and the continuing atrocities in modern conflicts, it is important for people to decide that there are some actions—especially actions toward marginalized cultural groups—that are inherently destructive to the well-being of humanity and to formulate international law accordingly. Following Benhabib, when considering what moral or ethical norms might be taken to be universal or codified as

international laws, we must resist the urge to generalize Western beliefs, instead engaging in multicultural discourse: "Because the discourse theory of ethics articulates a universalist moral standpoint, it cannot limit the scope of the moral conversation only to those who reside within nationally recognized boundaries; it views the moral conversation as potentially including all of humanity."¹¹ Thus, when I theorize about "better" policies and cultural practices about the Roma, I mean that such policies and practices should be conducive to their well-being as part of the collective well-being of humans regardless of their nationality and should arise through multicultural dialogue.

The Roma case study provides an interesting way to analyze the extent to which the European Union and other international groups have fulfilled their cosmopolitan moral and legal aspirations. The fact that the Roma are spread out across so many states makes the European Union's promised international human rights policies and nuanced notion of borders especially vital to Roma well-being. However, if such policies and notions are not adequately followed, or are not formulated with the participation of the Roma, it could become very easy for the transnational nature of the Roma population to be abused to foster a negative sort of international unity through which European states unite against a people that they view as a common scourge. Before analyzing how the recent trend toward cosmopolitan legal norms and human rights discourse has affected the non-territorial Roma, however, we must briefly consider

their history.

An Introduction to Roma History

According to the Arabian historian Hamza of Ispahan, who wrote at approximately the year 950 a.d., the Persian monarch Bahram Gur persuaded the king of India to send him 12,000 musicians so that his people would have music to accompany their eating and drinking. When he was displeased with their behavior, he cast them out to wander the world and play music for others. A similar story was corroborated by Firdawsi in the year 1010, and some modern scholars believe that the people referred to in these stories became the Roma.¹² Much of the other knowledge that Western scholars have inferred about their early history has been drawn from analyses of the various dialects of the Romani language.¹³ In any case, a general consensus seems to be that they did come from India, as the myth suggests, although there remains contestation over the particular region in which they originated.¹⁴ Over time, they have migrated through places such as Persia, Armenia, the Byzantine Empire, the Balkans, Serbia, Bulgaria, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Hungary.¹⁵

Throughout their history, the Roma have also suffered a great deal of discrimination. For example, in Romania, they were held as slaves for over 500 years until slavery was abolished in 1856.¹⁶ Hundreds of thousands of Roma were systematically killed during the Holocaust.¹⁷ In more recent times, the Roma have been "seized as the handiest

scapegoats for all of the ills of creaky communist societies in slow transition."¹⁸ Similarly, Sep Botermans cites a 2006 article by Rose, writing:

The Roma are most often seen as unwanted guests, bringing disease and criminality with them wherever they go. Because of this, the Roma often have to struggle with social exclusion and extreme poverty... This of course is a serious problem, especially when you bear to mind that the Roma, with approximately 10-12 million people, sum up to be the largest and most wide-spread minority group living within the EU.¹⁹

Also, citing a 2005 article by Guglielmo and Waters, Botermans concludes, "A historical review of state policies towards the Roma reveals a strong security-oriented bias; though there are differences in method, most policies have shared the basic aim of controlling Roma populations, populations that were considered alien, untrustworthy and destabilizing."²⁰ For example, according to the Human Rights Watch article, "Roma in the Czech Republic: Foreigners in Their Own Land," the immigration policies put in place by the Czech Republic when Czechoslovakia split in 1993 disproportionately disadvantaged the Roma populations, leaving many Roma without citizenship, "unable to vote, run for office, participate in the privatization process or seek redress for wrongs committed against them during the communist regime."²¹

Many other examples of anti-Roma discrimination focused on controlling their location and movement, often through

forced settlement. For example, in 1952, a program known as the Great Halt was put into effect in Poland to force the Roma people to abandon their traditionally nomadic ways and assimilate into a sedentary life.²² Countries such as Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania adopted similar policies.²³ In Great Britain, an opposite, but still distressing, program was put into place: technically, the Roma were not allowed to “stop” in the course of their nomadic lifestyle.²⁴

Contemporary national attempts to control Roma location and movement through deportation clash with cosmopolitan human rights laws enacted by the European Union: as Delanty writes, “With [the European Union’s] transformation into a post-sovereign political order, there have been unavoidable tensions between the pursuit of the national interests and the enhanced dynamic of the transnationalization of the nation-state.”²⁵ For example, in 2010, France’s then-president, Nicholas Sarkozy, ordered that France’s Roma population be deported to Romania, claiming that the move was a “decent and humane” tactic to free them from their current deplorable conditions.²⁶ The BBC also reports that “France repatriated some 10,000 Roma [in 2009] and other European countries, including Germany, Italy, Denmark and Sweden pursued similar policies.”²⁷ The president of Romania, Traian Basescu, decried Sarkozy’s plan, pointing out that such tactics impinged upon the Roma’s right to free movement between European Union nations (as guaranteed in the European Union’s 2007 Charter of Fundamental Rights).²⁸ As shown in this

example, the rise of international groups such as the United Nations and the European Union might provide a measure of hope to the Roma people in the face of national discrimination: however, there are aspects of the European Union that create complex relationships with its member states.

The European Union and the Paradox of Democratic Legitimacy

Established in 1951, the European Union was “initially an intergovernmental organization aimed at fostering the national interests of its members and pursuing limited economic integration.”²⁹ As Kant would have appreciated, a central goal of this federation was a perpetual peace to follow the horrors of the Second World War: “In this way, none can on its own make the weapons of war to turn against the other, as in the past.”³⁰ Over fifty years after its formation, the European Union adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which provides Roma people who reside in EU states a form of transnational citizenship and gives them with rights to free movement within the European Union. According to its text, the Charter of Fundamental Rights would seem to establish a form of transnational cosmopolitan citizenship: it “places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.”³¹ Importantly for the Roma, the Charter also establishes that “Every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely within the territory of

the Member States,” a principle that was flagrantly violated by Sarkozy in his—largely successful—attempt to expel the Roma.³² This shows that European Union human rights proclamations alone, while necessary, are not currently sufficient to protect the Roma people from national discrimination.

The European Union’s cosmopolitan tendencies—among other things—may also generate questions regarding its democratic legitimacy. Delanty notes that “On the one side, the EU seeks to have a democratic mandate from its member states and from citizens and, on the other side, it aims to strengthen the supranational level of political governance and become an influential global player.”³³ It would seem, at first glance, that the European Union is a legitimate and democratic institution, especially given that its representatives—at least, those in the European Parliament—are elected directly by European citizens.³⁴ However, some widely-circulated publications have criticized the notion that the EU is sufficiently democratic. A 2014 article in the *Economist* claimed:

Unlike the case with national parliaments, voters seldom know who their MEP [representative] is. In part this is because in many countries constituencies are vast and parties run a “closed list” system in which their leaders, not voters, choose who gets seats. Elections to the parliament also rarely change anything: whereas a national election can kick out an unpopular government, the European Parliament barely changes course regardless of whether the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) or the centre-left Socialists and

Democrats (S&D) is the largest group.³⁵

Questions about the European Union's power and legitimacy relate well to what Benhabib calls "the paradox of democratic legitimacy."³⁶ In short, Benhabib worries that international moral norms of human rights will not necessarily be democratically codified by nation-states. In her words, "Democratic rule and the claims of justice may contradict one another. The democratic precommitments expressed in the idealized

the American and French examples," for there may be some people within a state to whom these universal principles are not seen to apply, people who then fall through the cracks of national legal systems.³⁹

In my interpretation, the paradox of democratic legitimacy means that a national governing body will often feel itself pulled in two directions at once: it is pulled by the demands of its democratic populace whose wishes may be discriminatory and out of harmony with international human

the ability of each country to possess full national self-determination.

European Union Cosmopolitanism and Roma Policy

The European Union may possess cosmopolitan characteristics, but as shown by the 2010 incident of the Roma expulsion from France, it still sometimes struggles to solve cosmopolitan problems, including those relating to national and international

"An institution such as the European Union may wield its Charter of Fundamental Rights and try to pull national governments toward justice (manifested in our case as humane treatment toward the Roma), but in doing so, it may pull such national governments away from their citizens, thus undermining the democratic legitimacy of the national governments."

allegiance to universal human rights—life, liberty, and property—need to be reactualized and renegotiated within actual polities as democratic intentions."³⁷ This gap between positive laws set forth by nation-states and universal human rights exists in part because nation-states have historically conceived their ethical obligations to be confined to particular and limited communities: "Modern democracies act in the name of universal principles, which are then circumscribed within a particular civic community."³⁸ There could then arise a clash between international human rights and the rights of citizens that have (or have not been) codified by the state, creating a situation that is antithetical to the "idealized logic of the modern democratic revolutions following

rights, and it is pulled by the demands of justice or international human rights that may be out of harmony with the demands of its populace. An institution such as the European Union may wield its Charter of Fundamental Rights and try to pull national governments toward justice (manifested in our case as humane treatment toward the Roma), but in doing so, it may pull such national governments away from their citizens, thus undermining the democratic legitimacy of the national governments. In other words, human rights for groups such as the Roma could be enforced by international institutions such as the European Union or the United Nations, but seen in a certain light, such enforcement would undermine

policies about the Roma. According to Delanty, the European Union possesses what he sees to be the four central characteristics of cosmopolitanism: "the relativization of national identity, the beginning of a politics of recognition, critical and deliberative forms of culture, and signs of the emergence of a normative public culture."⁴⁰ However, these cosmopolitan aspects have not always translated to perfectly cosmopolitan laws and harmony with nation-states. Echoing Benhabib's worry about the paradox of democratic legitimacy, Delanty also notes the tensions that sometimes arise between the goals of the European Union and the goals of its member nations, writing, "With its transformation into a post-sovereign

political order, there have been unavoidable tensions between the pursuit of the national interests of its members and pursuing limited economic integration.”⁴¹ Indeed, although the European Union began to clearly address Roma issues in a transnational, cosmopolitan manner with its 2010 Communication on the Economic and Social Integration of the Roma in Europe, more progress may be needed to make the Roma strategies amenable not only to the European Union member nations, but also to the Roma people themselves.⁴²

For example, consider the summary of the Roma policies published in 2012, “National Roma Integration Strategies: A First Step in the Implementation of the EU Framework,” in which the European Union agreed upon four key areas for countries to target. The first area is education, and one major goal in that area is to increase primary school attainment: “Member States should enhance enrolment in early childhood education and care, the training of teachers and mediators, and the inclusion of Roma pupils in mainstream schools.”⁴³

However, this may not be amenable to the Roma, themselves, given that some Roma communities have been averse to Westernized, mainstream systems of education, and given the meager “education” that Western institutions have historically provided them. For example, Isabel Fonseca writes that “There are no words in Romani proper for ‘to write’ or ‘to read.’”⁴⁴ She also describes an all-Roma school she visited in Sliven, Bulgaria: “The kids were supposed to be taught job skills, and so they were, in a sweatshop setting. (Ten- and eleven-

year-olds installed the ballbearings in swivel desk chairs which would eventually be sold mainly, I was told, to Hungarian businesses).”⁴⁵ Additionally, Fonseca notes the language barrier and subsequent discrimination that many Roma children have historically faced in schools: these problems will need to be addressed in any successful E.U. policy on Roma education. As Fonseca writes:

Gypsy children from the first grades were automatically stuck into special schools for the mentally handicapped. They weren’t retarded [sic], but they were handicapped: they didn’t speak the language, and the deficiency had become a widespread excuse for segregation and indeed incarceration—one not likely to be fought by illiterate parents, themselves accustomed to such frank dispossession.⁴⁶

The second area is employment, and one major goal in that area is “identifying appropriate activities (both in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors) in which Roma can participate, thus ensuring real opportunities for Roma employment.”⁴⁷ However, given historical discrimination against the Roma, changing hiring patterns will not be as simple as issuing a decree. In interviews that Fonseca conducted with non-Roma Hungarian citizens, one respondent stated of the Roma, “They are vermin... They cannot live among decent, civilized people. They cannot feed their horses and their huge families, and so they steal... The Gypsies are not human.”⁴⁸ People who hold such attitudes toward the Roma will be unlikely

to hire them for jobs, regardless of what the European Union says about the value of Roma employment.

The third area is healthcare. Although “most Member States are aiming to improve healthcare access for Roma through outreach and other methods... few Member States defined a comprehensive approach to improve the health of Roma.”⁴⁹ The phrase, “comprehensive approach,” may be unnecessarily top-down and potentially counterproductive to Roma participation given their history of discrimination from outsiders. For example, Fonseca quotes an English Roma man named Gordon Boswell, who told a nurse, “I will not be poisoned,” when she was trying to inoculate him.⁵⁰ As Fonseca explains, “The fear was one of ritual—and perhaps also of physical—pollution incurred by allowing the inner body to make contact with unclean gadjo [non-Roma] equipment and culture.”⁵¹ Not all Roma people share Boswell’s fear, but a certain suspicion of non-Roma health care interventions would be entirely understandable given the history of anti-Roma discrimination. In any case, it does seem that many Roma are in need of improved health care—for example, Fonseca describes the prevalence of back-alley abortions among some Roma women in poorer communities—but in providing it, the nations of the European Union will need to also respect Roma cultural norms and understand those who are suspicious of outsiders.⁵²

The fourth and final area is housing: “Although all Member States agree with the

need to improve the housing conditions of many Roma, few propose concrete measures as part of an integrated approach to tackle the situation.”⁵³ It is true that many Roma live in impoverished housing situations, which Fonseca describes and illustrates with photographs.⁵⁴ But as was the case with the issue of healthcare, it seems that an “integrated approach” to housing will only be effective if the Roma themselves are engaged in its creation: otherwise, it could easily be seen as an imposition by outsiders on their ways of life. Additionally, Roma houses have often been burned to the ground by townspeople angry about having them in their community: this issue of deep-rooted prejudice and violence will need to be addressed in any successful Roma housing policy.⁵⁵

In short, when trying to solve the problems faced by many Roma people regarding education, employment, healthcare, and housing, EU representatives must recognize how these interventions may be impacted by past and present discrimination against the Roma and incorporate Roma participation whenever possible. The particular suspicions and cultural practices held by the Roma people and communities described above are not necessarily universal; nevertheless, the EU should realize that their policies focused on the Roma might be read with a certain degree of suspicion by Roma people given the history of governments and non-Roma people attempting to control, deport, and annihilate them. The EU must also recognize the ways that ongoing discrimination against

the Roma may undermine their efforts in arenas such as employment and housing, and work to combat such discrimination.

Proposed Solutions

When considering what kinds of political changes or new political formations would be best for the Roma people, it would be a disservice not to first turn to them and to their seasoned allies for advice. Indeed, the Roma people are not simply passive pawns in political jousting matches between national and international players: rather, they are often agents who desire that their ideas and actions would change their political situation. It would obviously be futile and essentializing to look for one single Roma Perspective on Roma rights and Roma governance, except perhaps to infer that they all wish to be treated as human beings by those who govern. Nevertheless, it does not seem to be futile to investigate some of the ways that Roma groups and their allies have exercised their agency and tried to reform political structures according to their own visions, and to infer that many Roma see greater political clout through Roma-led and Roma-focused political organizations as a crucial step toward a solution to the failure of international bodies such as the European Union to fully protect them from national discrimination.

For example, the Roma themselves have taken some political action to try to lessen their marginalization by working in and with various governmental agencies in attempts to secure their rights. According to Dena Ringold, “Because of the lack of

a national homeland and connections with a single nation-state, Roma have turned to international agencies and bodies as a conduit for discussing policies and advocating their policy agenda at both the cross-national and country level.”⁵⁶ Citing a 2011 article by Gheorge and Migra, Botermans writes:

Since the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the Roma community started to politically involve itself actively at both the national and European level. In line with this, Roma NGO’s were established and members of a newly emerging Roma political elite started to make sure that the interests of the Roma community were acknowledged by the important European organizations, such as the EU, the Council of Europe, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as the legislative bodies and governments of separate European states.⁵⁷

For example, the European Roma Rights Center, established in 1996, “is an international public interest law organisation working to combat anti-Romani racism and human rights abuse of Roma through strategic litigation, research and policy development, advocacy and human rights education,” according to its website.⁵⁸ It works closely with the Council of Europe “as well as with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations,” and its current priorities include improving state response to violence and hate speech, access to education, access to housing, free movement and migration, identity

"The European Union would do well to promote recognition of and solidarity with the Roma members of the European people and to strive for the creation of a European identity that is broad enough to include marginalized groups such as the Roma. The work it does to create a multicultural and cosmopolitan European identity must be paralleled by work to ensure that there is also multicultural representation within the European Union."

documents, women's and children's rights, and disaggregated data collection.⁵⁹ The first World Romani Congress, in 1971, led to the formation of the International Romani Union, a political organization that includes over thirty member states.⁶⁰ According to its website, it has three branches—Congress, Parliament, and the Presidium of the Court of Justice—each of which plays a role in this new democratic formation.⁶¹ Thus, one can infer that one Roma suggestion for change might be the creation of new Roma-led, Roma-focused political organizations that are transnational and cosmopolitan in scope, and one can see that such organizations are beginning to become a reality.

The development of Roma political institutions has also led to Roma critiques of the International Romani Union and the European Union. For example, the Romani Nation Building Action Plan, developed at the seventh World Romani Congress, criticized the lack of integration between the International Romani Union and the European Union, asserting that the IRU "never played any leading role into the European politics for Romani inclusion,

trusting the positive changes claimed to be brought into Romani inclusion by EU and its member states, other non EU states and leading Romani organizations."⁶² Thus, it seems that in order for the goal of Roma political power to be achieved, Roma political organizations must not only be created, but must be skillfully integrated with other international organizations.

The creation of such organizations by and for Roma people connects well with an idea proposed by Robert Michelman and explained by Seyla Benhabib: the idea of "jurisgenerative processes" through which "a democratic people, which considers itself bound by certain guiding norms and principles, engages in iterative acts by reappropriating and reinterpreting these, thereby showing itself to be not only the subject but also the author of the laws."⁶³ In other words, through jurisgenerative processes, a people such as the Roma can exercise a form of self-rule by creatively interpreting their values and ensconcing them in the legal realm. However, it does bear noting that, as Fonseca writes, words for conference, congress, and parliament,

are some of the newest words to the Roma language, and "these concepts remain alien, even antithetical, to the internal organization of the Gypsy people," who have historically sought to govern themselves and protect their way of life from interaction with outsiders.⁶⁴ Fonseca's claim about the alienness of Western politics to Roma life may be a bit strong and general, but regardless, it is possible that using the terminology of Western political philosophy to analyze Roma political behavior may inappropriately impose a foreign and hegemonic framework on their politics. I use this terminology in the spirit of advancing the discussion of Roma rights within mainstream political theory, not in the spirit of overriding Roma ways of conceptualizing society and politics.

My own proposed solution to the cosmopolitan problems described in this paper begins with Benhabib's idea of democratic iterations and advocates for a form of transnational democracy that entails cooperation between the European Union, Roma-centered NGO's, and state entities. However, the acceptance, flexibility, and cosmopolitan thinking needed to create such a democratic iteration might only arise after a change in cultural perceptions about the Roma, a change that could be catalyzed through changes in education. Also, in order for such a change to occur, the European Union would need to embrace a broader and more complex vision of Europe that is not just centered on Western Europe—a vision that accepts the Roma as full European citizens.

I would propose to move from a solely

national to a mixed national and transnational vision of democracy, one with a multileveled structure and a multicultural focus. Such a move is possible because the notion of democracy is not static. For example, in *Another Cosmopolitanism*, Benhabib proposes the idea of multiple forms of democracy, or rather, democratic iterations, that often result from jurisgenerative processes. “Democratic iterations,” writes Benhabib, “are linguistic, legal, cultural, and political repetitions-in-transformation, invocations that are also revocations. They not only change established understandings but also transform what passes as the valid or established view of an authoritative precedent.”⁶⁵ Thus, democracy is not one monolithic, static entity, but something that can be inventively recreated as an infinite series of variations based on the needs of the particular culture that uses it.

We can apply this idea of democracy to the worry that the European Union is undemocratic, or that its actions—or the actions of any transnational governing body—undermine the democratic legitimacy of its member states. I argue that in a sense, the European Union may already possess democratic legitimacy and exist as a democratic iteration, assuming, of course, that the vast majority of the representatives that constitute it would be democratically elected by the voters of their respective states. This is especially true—i.e. the European Union will be a legitimate iteration of democracy—if it can change in response to criticisms such as those leveled at it by the *Economist* article cited earlier in

this paper. Thus, the paradox of democratic legitimacy may not be as dire as Benhabib makes it out to be—under this view, when representatives to transnational bodies such as the EU are democratically elected, the tension between national interests and the transnational interests of the European Union is greatly diminished. This is not to say that it is gone: citizens of a member state are still subject to the effect of votes cast by European Parliament representatives that they did not vote for from other states. However, this may be a concession that citizens sometimes need to make in the interest of cooperation and the resolution of international problems.

The European Union should continue to make provisions for the protection of transnational minorities, such as the Roma, and make them out of a process of dialogue with groups such as the International Romani Union: this inclusion should extend beyond the political structures of the European Union. To be willing to welcome Roma people and Roma political organizations may require changes in culture and in consciousness that would create a more thoughtful and inclusive idea of European identity. In the case of the European Union, it may require a broader conception of who counts as a European citizen. Although the European Union began as an economic and military alliance, it can also play a central role in shaping European identity, and it needs to be thoughtful about the notion of European identity that it creates. As Delanty writes,

The European project needs to respond to new

kinds of diversity which were largely absent in its foundation. Such forms of diversity extend beyond the older national communities to include social groups of all kinds, but specifically ethnic and minority groups... The European project needs to be relaunched around a new idea in which political community is more central than market-based objectives... The main feature of this is a more inclusive conception of the European polity based on recognition and solidarity.⁶⁶

Following Delanty’s lead, it seems that the European Union would do well to promote recognition of and solidarity with the Roma members of the European people and to strive for the creation of a European identity that is broad enough to include marginalized groups such as the Roma. The work it does to create a multicultural and cosmopolitan European identity must be paralleled by work to ensure that there is also multicultural representation within the European Union: this would ensure that all members of the European Union feel adequately represented and it would help to ameliorate the paradox of democratic legitimacy—the sense that international human rights regulations are not democratically supported by the people. Such actions operate not only at the legal level, but also at the cultural level, to a degree such that the two realms become difficult to separate.

Therefore, in order to solve the problems facing the Roma people in Europe, we must not think only on the legal or political level, but we must also investigate solutions through cultural and educational changes. For example, cultural solutions

to discrimination against the Roma may require a refusal to devalue the humanities and may also require a change in how subjects such as history and social studies are taught—a change that is not merely a superficial change in focus. Regarding the devaluation of the humanities, Fred Dallmayr argues that the recent and often exclusionary focus in higher education on science and technology “comes at a steep price,” noting the prevalence of crimes against humanity and asking, “But how can such crimes be combated or reduced if there is no deliberate cultivation of humanity and humaneness—which is precisely the aim of the humanities?”⁶⁷ Indeed, if leaders and citizens are to treat minority groups such as the Roma humanely, they must be encouraged to pursue humane studies as part of their education. Regarding changes in teaching practices, as Parekh writes, “It is not enough to broaden the curriculum and include different religions, cultures, texts and systems of belief: one should also bring them into a fruitful dialogue.”⁶⁸ While his suggestion is vague, he recognizes the value of refusing to make multicultural education a whirlwind tour: instead, Parekh hopes that educators will help students engage deeply with cross-cultural material by highlighting the ways that different cultural practices speak to similar or different issues. Hopefully, educators in Europe and beyond will integrate information about the Roma as part of their dialogic multicultural curricula.

Conclusions

In sum, greater legal protections for

the Roma people will be necessary, but not sufficient, to combat the historical discrimination they have faced. To begin to remedy their situation, the European Union must strive not only to be a legitimate democratic iteration that upholds the ideals of moral cosmopolitanism often found in human rights law, but also to be a multicultural and cosmopolitan institution that works in inclusive and multileveled ways with national entities and with groups such as the IRU. Additionally, as the case studies about housing, education, employment, and healthcare show, the European Union must strive to be an institution that takes cultural practices into account when formulating international policy, while recognizing that there is often heterogeneity within such cultures. Changes in non-Roma cultural beliefs must also play a central role in improving the welfare of the Roma in Europe. As Sarkozy’s case shows, without an accurate understanding of Roma culture, leaders and citizens alike may not feel incentivized to follow through on promised protections or to welcome Roma people fully into the national or European community. However, with better education about the Roma, people may begin to adopt a more inclusive and cosmopolitan mindset toward the Roma that could lead to cultural and political change.

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